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ABSTRACT 
Multiple reports by the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign centered at Sandia National 
Laboratories, Dr. Michael Driscoll and collaborators at MIT, and Dr. Fergus Gibb and 
collaborators at the University of Sheffield have generated interest in deep boreholes as a nuclear 
waste disposal option for all or part of the U.S. high-level waste inventory. Many design 
elements of deep borehole disposal have not yet been solidified, and there has not yet been a 
systematic analysis of the logistics necessary to implement deep boreholes for the storage of 
commercial spent nuclear fuel. This thesis contains preliminary analysis on a variety of 
unanswered or incomplete elements of the deep borehole approach, including emplacement 
method, disposal region design, canister loading method, transportation and logistics scheduling 
and cost, and risk analysis for borehole-specific issues. Additionally, the thesis presents an 
analytical heat transport model which can be used to validate more detailed numerical solutions. 
The logistics analysis, performed using the TSL-CALVIN fuel cycle logistics simulator, 
demonstrates that a deep borehole repository can be cost-competitive with a more traditional 
mined repository approach, but that the differences between mined repositories and a deep 
borehole repository are large enough that other system-level cost estimates performed for the 
Yucca Mountain repository might not transfer to a deep borehole repository. 
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1. Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Energy’s attempt to withdraw the Yucca Mountain high-level 
radioactive waste repository license application has spurred interest in alternative nuclear waste 
repository designs (UFDC 2012). Many of these designs have been the subject of extensive 
research programs in Europe during the years since the Yucca Mountain repository was chosen 
by Congress with the 1987 Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. These designs include 
disposal in crystalline rock (pursued by Sweden and Finland), disposal in clay and shale (pursued 
by France and Switzerland), and disposal in salt, including a United States program which 
culminated in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. A fourth design option, deep borehole disposal, 
was considered for disposal in Sweden (Juhlin et al. 1998) and has seen consideration for a 
variety of other applications ranging from spent fuel disposition (NIREX 2005). These include 
disposal of excess weapons-grade material (Gibb et al. 2008) and the injection of liquid waste 
(Compton et al. 2000). Unlike geologic repositories, which are scaled to the desired storage 
capacity, each deep borehole has a fixed storage capacity (for instance, 400 spent fuel assemblies 
per borehole) and boreholes are built as necessary to accommodate the amount of waste. 
In addition, deep boreholes dispose of waste much deeper than in geologic repositories, with an 
average disposal depth of up to four kilometers, as opposed to a few hundred meters for many 
traditional repository designs. Deeper disposal can help inhibit radionuclide transfer to potable 
water and reduce the cost of engineered barriers to radionuclide release, and reduce economic 
incentives for eventual intrusion to recover materials used in engineered barriers. 
In response to the need for research and development of alternative nuclear waste storage 
technology, the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) Campaign was established by the Department of 
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Energy-Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) to assess disposal options other than Yucca 
Mountain. These options are disposal salt, clay, crystalline rock, and deep boreholes. With work 
focused at Sandia National Laboratories, several reports were produced to outline each disposal 
technology and to identify gaps in technology or knowledge between the state-of-the-art and 
implementation. Each disposal method is discussed in an extensive report, including Hansen and 
Leigh (2011) for disposal in salt, Hansen et al. (2010) for clay and shale, Mariner et al. (2011) 
for crystalline rock (granite), and Brady et al. (2009) for deep boreholes. In addition to the 
storage of spent nuclear fuel, deep boreholes were identified as a candidate to dispose of specific 
defense wastes, in particular cesium and strontium capsules currently stored at Hanford 
(SNL 2014). The potential use of deep boreholes to store non-commercial high-level waste 
necessitated further study into specific elements of the deep borehole design, namely the 
performance of the sealing system and the mode of emplacement of waste canisters down the 
borehole. Many of these further studies were presented to the Nuclear Waste Technical Review 
Board in October, 2015, and the program hopes to engage in a demonstration project in the near 
future. With the UFD’s deep borehole disposal efforts focused on the successful disposition of 
the cesium and strontium capsules, several questions remain unanswered in regards to the deep 
borehole disposal of spent nuclear fuel. This thesis addresses some of these concerns for the 
commercial spent fuel case. 
1.1 Deep Borehole Reference Design 
A reference design for deep borehole disposal (DBD) is discussed in three reports from Sandia 
National Laboratories (Brady et al. 2009, Arnold et al. 2011, Brady et al. 2012). These studies, in 
turn, rely on work performed by the Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, an early DBD report 
from Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (O’Brien et al 1979), and a report on the “very deep hole 
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design” by Woodward-Clyde Consultants (1983). The major features of the reference design will 
be summarized in this section. 
The reference borehole (shown below in Figure 1.1) is 5 km deep and is divided into a 3 
km non-disposal region and a 2 km disposal region and is cased throughout. The non-disposal 
region is primarily in sedimentary rock, although the bottom part penetrates the crystalline 
basement rock in which the waste is stored. The disposal region is in crystalline rock with a bore 
diameter of 50cm, which is sufficient to contain a single canistered PWR assembly. The 
transition region between the disposal and non-disposal regions will contain a system of seals 
meant to slow the upward flow of groundwater and radionuclides during the “thermal pulse.” 
The thermal pulse is the initial phase after the borehole is sealed, in which phase heat from 
radioactive decay may drive flow upwards against the natural saline gradient (Brady et al. 2009). 
Many alternatives have been proposed to seal the borehole, ranging from the more traditional 
clay-and-cement barrier to metal barriers or melting the host rock shut to close the borehole. 
Sealing methods, especially the behavior of bentonite seals under reducing conditions, are 
adequately described elsewhere (Pusch 2015, Arnold et al. 2011) and so will not be covered in 
this thesis. 
The preferred emplacement system in the reference design, originally proposed by 
Woodward-Clyde Consultants (1983), uses a modified drilling rig to lower a string of canisters 
to depth. This string of canisters is assembled canister by canister near the surface and then 
lowered to depth with the addition of segments of drill pipe. Alternatives have been proposed, 
including using wire rope to lower individual canisters to depth or a “drop-in” method in which 
canisters are allowed to freefall at a slow rate to depth. These options are discussed in section 3.1 
of this thesis. Additionally, the modes of failure and the consequences of failure during the 
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emplacement are not covered at length in the reference design. A preliminary top-down approach 
to system failure is found in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1 Deep borehole disposal reference design 
Finally, while cost estimates are provided in the SNL reference design for all components 
of the physical DBD system (Arnold et al. 2011), there is no comprehensive economic 
assessment for deep boreholes that includes all elements of the system. A more detailed cost 
estimate for borehole construction can be found in Gibbs (2010), though this estimate does not 
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consider transportation and other system-level costs. As a deep borehole repository would accept 
and handle waste at different rates and times compared to a geologic repository, transportation 
and interim storage costs are likely to be different. Because of the differences in fuel handling 
times and canister size, an analysis of the transportation and storage-related costs for a borehole 
repository is necessary. Chapter 4 of this thesis presents a regional transportation case for deep 
boreholes, possibly the first of its kind. 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
This thesis will address a series of borehole-related problems which have not yet been solved in 
sufficient detail. These problems are summarized in order below. 
The U.S. commercial spent fuel inventory is diverse, including a variety of fuel designs 
over a range of fuel burnups and ages. As a result, there is no single value for a spent fuel 
assembly’s heat generation rate. Disposal could occur at a variety of depths and geometries, and 
slight changes in the heat transfer properties of the rock (which vary formation to formation) can 
alter the heat transport properties of the system.  
Several design changes from the reference design are possible if goals that differ from the 
reference case are chosen. These changes are considered in chapter 3 of this thesis. First, the wire 
rope emplacement system, an alternative to the modified drilling rig, is considered. Second, a 
modification to the drilling plan with a larger upper disposal region and smaller lower disposal 
region (the “telescoping borehole”) is covered. The chapter ends with a description of a deep 
borehole canister loading process that could save time over more traditional methods. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis considers the logistics and cost of a large deep borehole specific 
repository, focusing on a regional implementation of the borehole design in the U.S. Midwest. 
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This logistical analysis uses the TSL-CALVIN logistics code designed for Yucca Mountain, so 
this analysis requires the creation of a new set of parameters for a deep borehole repository. 
Chapter 5 proposes a preliminary fault tree for the deep borehole system, with failures 
ranging from failure during construction to failure during emplacement. Without similar 
examples in other industries for comparison, many of the failure modes for the borehole system, 
especially in the area of emplacement, require further analysis. On the other hand, the portions of 
the deep borehole system which involve drilling often have considerable research on which to 
depend. The analysis presented here is not quantitative, but it provides the basic framework 
necessary for further analysis.  
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2. Thermal Transport Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
Given the complexity of waste disposal in the subsurface, including the properties of the host 
rock and of the waste form, it is useful to solve the analytical heat transfer problem for a series of 
parallel boreholes prior to pursuing more complicated models. The analytical solution presented 
in this chapter can help verify numerical models and provide first-order estimates for 
temperature values for secondary calculations like canister corrosion rates and the sensitivity of 
maximum temperature to borehole spacing. The method described below is based on an 
analytical solution to the two-region infinite cylinder heat conduction problem solved by Clifford 
Singer (personal communication 2015) using a method described by Donald Amos (2013).  
Even decades after discharge from the reactor, spent fuel still emits considerable 
radioactive decay heat. In an environment like a spent fuel pool or outdoor in a dry cask, this 
heat does not pose any significant design limitations. However, when placed in a confined space 
like a repository or borehole where the surrounding rock does not quickly transmit heat, the 
decay heat can appreciably raise the temperature of the disposal canister, host rock, and 
groundwater. A very large temperature increase could create a convective instability in 
surrounding groundwater, disturbing the vertical saline gradient and transporting radionuclides 
upwards at a greater rate. Smaller temperature increases can accelerate corrosion rates of the 
canister and fuel, which in turn increase the rate at which radionuclides escape containment. 
Given an age and burnup of fuel, it is possible to analytically model thermal transport from spent 
fuel through the canister and into the formation, including the interaction of the temperature 
profiles from parallel boreholes. The analysis presented here should eventually be backed up by 
a more complex numerical solution, but the analytic solution should provide insight into the 
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relationship between fuel canister heat generation rate and canister temperature as well as 
whether or not a convective instability could form. This chapter will discuss the assumptions 
necessary to model the system analytically, demonstrate the method of determining the 
approximate decay heat of an assembly, derive a solution for an infinite cylindrical two-region 
Green’s function heat transport problem, and provide the results of the model at various points 
within a field of sixteen parallel tubes.  
2.2 Assumptions for the Model 
There are a number of complexities of the real system which are either too complex to account 
for in the analytic solution or not significant enough to warrant inclusion. In the case of 
rectangular fuel, incorporating that shape into a system that is otherwise cylindrical is not 
analytically practical. However, modeling the rectangular fuel as a circle with the same surface 
area and heat generation rate is an acceptable approximation. For the purpose of heat modeling, 
disposal tubes of finite length can also be simplified to tubes of infinite length. The boreholes are 
long enough that the maximum temperature at the center of the finite disposal region is the same 
(or nearly the same) as the maximum temperature in an infinite tube, so forgoing the complexity 
of modeling the “end” of a tube is acceptable. This is doubly true because the model is primarily 
concerned with the maximum temperature of the canister, casing, and host formation and its 
effect on corrosion and other properties, so overestimation of the temperature in colder regions 
of the model is inconsequential. The sample granite modeled here has a density of 2,750 kg/m3, a 
heat capacity of 790 J/kgK, and a thermal conductivity of 3 W/mK. 
2.3 Modeling the Heat Source and Environment 
Isotope inventories used in this analysis were solved for analytically by Lartonoix (2012) under 
the direction of Clifford Singer. It is possible to generate an approximate isotopic inventory at 
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discharge from the reactor and then to simulate the decay of isotopes over the chosen amount of 
time between discharge and disposal. While spent fuel contains dozens of isotopes, the vast 
majority of a spent fuel assembly’s heat generation comes from a core group of isotopes. This 
isotope group is Sr-90, Cs-137, Am-241, Am-243, and Pu-238 through 242. Results for these are 
summed to find the total volumetric heat rate of the fuel. Based on initial enrichment, burnup, 
and assembly mass, the initial isotope inventory for the key isotopes listed above can be 
estimated and marched forward in time for many years until disposal. The model PWR assembly 
has an initial linear heat generation rate of 43.1 W/m at disposal. 
2.4 Infinite Two-Region Cylindrical Green’s Function Derivation for Heat 
Transport 
This section describes a Green’s function solution for a two-region infinite cylinder with a source 
in one region adapted from Amos (2013). The two cylinders touch at the edge of the canister, at 
radius a. The inner cylinder (Region 1) represents the spent fuel canister, whereas Region 2 is the 
medium outside of the waste canister. Where j refers to either region 1 or region 2, the general 
form of the temperature at a given point and time is: 
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𝑇𝑗(𝑃
′, 𝑡) =
𝛼𝑗
𝑘𝑗
[ ∬ 𝐺𝑗
𝑗(𝑃, 𝑃′, 𝑡 − 𝜏)𝑞𝑗(𝑃, 𝜏)𝑑𝑉𝑑𝜏
𝑡   
0 𝑉𝑗
+ ∫
𝑡
0
∫ 𝐺3−𝑗
𝑗 (𝑃, 𝑃′, 𝑡 − 𝜏)𝑞3−𝑗(𝑃, 𝜏)𝑑𝑉𝑑𝜏
𝑉3−𝑗
]
+ ∫ 𝐺𝑗
𝑗(𝑃, 𝑃′, 𝑡 − 0)𝑓𝑗(𝑃)𝑑𝑉
𝑉𝑗
+
𝑘3−𝑗𝛼𝑗
𝑘𝑗𝛼3−𝑗
∫ 𝐺3−𝑗
𝑗 (𝑃, 𝑃′, 𝑡 − 0)𝑓3−𝑗(𝑃)𝑑𝑉
𝑉3−𝑗
+ 𝛼𝑗 ∫
𝑡
0
∫ [𝑇𝑗(𝑃, 𝜏)
𝛿𝐺𝑗
𝑗(𝑃, 𝑃′, 𝑡 − 𝜏)
𝛿𝑛𝑖
− 𝐺𝑗
𝑗(𝑃, 𝑃′, 𝑡 − 𝜏)
𝛿𝑇𝑗(𝑃, 𝜏)
𝛿𝑛𝑖
] 𝑑𝑆𝑗𝑑𝜏
𝑆𝑗−𝑆𝑐
+
𝑘3−𝑗𝛼𝑗
𝑘𝑗
 ∫
𝑡
0
∫ [
𝑇3−𝑗(𝑃, 𝜏)𝛿𝐺𝑗
𝑗(𝑃, 𝑃′, 𝑡 − 𝜏)
𝛿𝑛𝑖
𝑆3−𝑗−𝑆𝑐
− 𝐺3−𝑗
𝑗 (𝑃, 𝑃′, 𝑡 − 𝜏)
𝛿𝑇3−𝑗(𝑃, 𝜏)
𝛿𝑛𝑖
] 𝑑𝑆3−𝑗𝑑𝜏 
V and S are, respectively, the volume and of each region, with Sc as the contact between the two 
cylinders and Sj-Sc as the external boundary. q represents the heat source and f represents the 
initial temperature distribution.  
The conduction equations for the two Green’s functions, assuming a finite inner cylinder 
of radius a and radially-infinite outer cylinder, are: 
∇2𝐺1 =
1
𝛼1
𝛿𝐺1
𝛿𝑡
 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 0 < 𝑟 < 𝑎  
∇2𝐺2 =
1
𝛼2
𝛿𝐺2
𝛿𝑡
 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎 < 𝑟 < ∞ 
These are bounded by the following conditions: 
𝐺2(𝑟, 𝑡) → 0 𝑎𝑠 𝑟 → ∞ 
𝐺1(𝑎, 𝑡) = 𝐺2(𝑎, 𝑡) 
𝑘1
𝛿𝐺1
𝛿𝑟
(𝑎, 𝑡) = 𝑘2
𝛿𝐺2
𝛿𝑟
(𝑎, 𝑡) 
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with an initial condition of: 
𝐺𝑗(𝑟, 0) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐺1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺2 
The superscripts of the Green’s functions, which denote the region (1 or 2) that the source is in, 
are always going to be 1 for the derivation presented here. Therefore, 𝐺1(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑡) is assumed to 
be the same as 𝐺1
1(𝑟, 𝑟′, 𝑡). The source function can be represented as: 
𝑆1(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑡) =
𝐵1
2𝑡
 𝑒
−
(𝑟2+𝑟′2)
4𝛼1𝑡 𝐼0 (
𝑟𝑟′
2𝛼1𝑡
) 
Where 𝐵1 =
1
2𝜋𝛼1
 and I0 is a modified Bessel function. 
Taking the Laplace transform of the conduction equations with parameter p, the transformed 
equations become: 
𝐺1̅̅ ̅(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑝) = 𝑆1̅(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑝) + 𝐴𝐼0(𝑞1𝑟) 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 0 ≤ 𝑟 < 𝑎 
𝐺2̅̅ ̅(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑝) = 𝐵𝐾0(𝑞2𝑟) 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎 < 𝑟 < ∞ 
Where 𝑞𝑗 = √𝑝/𝛼𝑗   
The source is located at some radius r’, so the source can be broken up into two equations, which 
are: 
𝑆1̅(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑝) = 𝐵1𝐼0(𝑞1𝑟
′)𝐾0(𝑞1𝑟) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑟 > 𝑟′ 
𝑆1̅(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑝) = 𝐵1𝐼0(𝑞1𝑟)𝐾0(𝑞1𝑟′) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑟 < 𝑟′ 
Applying the continuity boundary conditions from above, it is possible to solve for A and B. 
These constants are: 
𝐴 = 𝐵1𝐼0(𝑞1𝑟
′)[−𝑞2𝑘2𝐾1(𝑞2𝑎)𝐾0(𝑞1𝑎) + 𝑞1𝑘1𝐾1(𝑞1𝑎)𝐾0(𝑞2𝑎]/𝐷 
𝐵 = 𝐵1𝐼0(𝑞1𝑟
′)[𝑞1𝑘1𝐾1(𝑞1𝑎)𝐼0(𝑞1𝑎) + 𝑞1𝑘1𝐼1(𝑞1𝑎)𝐾0(𝑞1𝑎)]/𝐷 
𝐷 = 𝑞2𝑘2𝐾1(𝑞2𝑎)𝐼0(𝑞1𝑎) + 𝑞1𝑘1𝐼1(𝑞1𝑎)𝐾0(𝑞2𝑎) 
B can be further simplified to: 
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𝐵 =
𝑘1
𝑎
 𝐵1𝐼0(𝑞1𝑟
′)/𝐷 
Therefore, the inverse transform takes the form of: 
𝐺(𝑟, 𝑟′, 𝑡) =
1
2𝜋𝑖
∫ ?̅?(𝑟, 𝑟′, 𝑝)𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑑𝑝
𝛾+𝑖∞
𝛾−𝑖∞
   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛾 > 0 
This integrand has no poles, but both transformed functions will have a branch point at p=0, so it 
is necessary to cut around the branch point. This will split up the integral into a negative infinity 
portion, a positive infinity portion, and a keyhole contour around the branch point. This looks 
like: 
𝐺(𝑟, 𝑟′, 𝑡) = −
2
𝜋
∫ 𝐼𝑚{?̅?(𝑟, 𝑟′, 𝑝)}𝑝=𝑤2𝑒𝑖𝜋𝑞𝑒
−𝑤2𝑡𝑑𝑤
∞
0
+ lim
𝜖→0
1
2𝜋𝑖
∫ {?̅?(𝑟, 𝑟′, 𝑝)𝑒𝑝𝑡}𝑝=𝜖𝑒𝑖𝜃𝜖𝑒
𝑖𝜃𝑑𝜃
−𝜋
𝜋
 
Where Im is the imaginary portion of the Green’s function. 
The above equation simplifies into the following equations for G1 and G2: 
𝐺1(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑡) =
4𝑘1𝑘2
𝜋2𝑎2
 𝐵1 ∫
𝐽0 (
𝛾1𝑤𝑟
′
𝑎 ) 𝐽0 (
𝛾1𝑤𝑟
𝑎 )
𝑤(𝑑1
2 + 𝑑2
2)
∞
0
𝑒−𝑤
2𝑡𝑑𝑤 
𝐺2(𝑟, 𝑟
′, 𝑡) =
2𝑘2
𝜋𝑎
 𝐵2 ∫
𝐽0 (
𝛾1𝑤𝑟
′
𝑎 ) [𝑑1𝐽0 (
𝛾2𝑤𝑟
𝑎 ) − 𝑑2𝑌0 (
𝛾2𝑤𝑟
𝑎 )]
𝑑1
2 + 𝑑2
2 𝑒
−𝑤2𝑡𝑑𝑤
∞
0
 
Where: 
𝑑1(𝑤) = −𝛿2𝐽0(𝛾1𝑤)𝑌1(𝛾2𝑤) + 𝛿1𝐽1(𝛾1𝑤)𝑌0(𝛾2𝑤) 
𝑑2(𝑤) = −𝛿2𝐽0(𝛾1𝑤)𝐽1(𝛾2𝑤) + 𝛿1𝐽0(𝛾2𝑤)𝐽1(𝛾1𝑤) 
𝛿𝑗 = 𝑘𝑗/√𝛼𝑗 
𝛾𝑗 = 𝑎/√𝛼𝑗 
𝐵𝑗 = 1/2𝜋𝛼𝑗  
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Substituting the solved Green’s functions into the original equation for temperature and 
eliminating the pieces that are equal to zero (as the original equation is general and includes a 
potential source in both regions), the below equation is derived. Given a time point i and isotope 
j, the temperature increase from the decay of that isotope can be expressed as: 
𝑇(𝑟, 𝑡) = 𝑇0 ∫
(𝐽1 (𝑏 ∗
𝑎𝑓
𝑎𝑐
) 𝐽0 (𝑟 ∗
𝑏
𝑎𝑐
) ∗ (exp(−𝑐0
2 ∗ 𝑏2 ∗ 𝜏𝑖𝑗) − exp(−𝜏𝑖𝑗)))
(𝑑1
2 + 𝑑2
2)(1 − 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑐0
2)
 𝑑𝑏
∞
0
 
Where 𝑎𝑓 is the outer radius of the canister, 𝑎𝑐 is the inner radius of the canister, and 𝜆 is the 
decay rate of each isotope in question (of which there are j): 
𝑇0 =
4𝑞0𝛼𝑗𝑑
𝜆𝑟2
∗ (
𝛼2
𝑘2
) 
𝜏 = 𝜆𝑡 
𝑏 = 𝑥/𝑐0 
𝑏𝑓 =
𝑏𝑎𝑓
𝑎𝑐
 
𝑏𝑟 = 𝑏𝑟/𝑎𝑐 
𝑐0 =
√𝛼1𝜆
𝑎𝑐
 
The integrals can be computed using Mathematica’s NIntegrate function. As there is no value of 
infinity, it is necessary to determine how large a value of “infinity” will lead to satisfactory 
convergence. A satisfactory convergence is found by integrating from 𝑏 = 0 to 𝑏 = 6/𝜏𝑖𝑗. 
2.5 Thermal Transport Model Results 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below demonstrate the temperature evolution of the canister temperature 
over the first 1,000 years and the entire 10,000-year model window. The innermost borehole is 
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denoted by the n=1 notation, whereas n=8 denotes the outermost two boreholes of the sixteen 
parallel tubes. In other words, the n=1 borehole sits at the center of sixteen parallel, heat-
generating tubes, while the n=8 borehole has fifteen tubes to one side and none on the other. 
 
Figure 2.1 Temperature profiles above background temperature for fuel canisters for the first 
1,000 years. 
The profile makes a steep decline over the first 10,000 years (Lartinoix 2012), which is the 
required confinement time for U.S. spent fuel repositories other than Yucca Mountain put forth 
in 40 CFR Part 191, encompassing over nine half-lives of Americium-241. 
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Figure 2.2 Temperature profiles above background temperature for fuel canisters over 10,000 
years. 
2.6 Discussion of Results 
Arnold et al. (2011) considers the heat conduction case for a spent PWR assembly in the deep 
borehole. For a PWR assembly of approximately the same heat generation rate as considered in 
this case, their model yielded a maximum temperature increase of around 12 degrees Celsius at 
around 10 years after disposal. Arnold et al.’s figure is reproduced below in Figure 2.3. The n=1, 
n=2, and n=4 boreholes shown in Figure 2.2 best capture this behavior, as the Arnold et al. case 
did not consider the heat conduction effects from nearby boreholes. The n=1 borehole is slightly 
hotter than the subsequent series, but barely so, as it is difficult to distinguish from nearby series. 
It is likely that the slightly colder waste form featured here is offset by a slight heating effect 
from the interior boreholes on the outermost borehole. The peak temperature time is also off by 
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an order of magnitude, but this is also a result of the heat pulses migrating between boreholes. 
When compared to Arnold et al., the waste form chosen here has undergone at least one 
additional half-life of both cesium-137 and strontium-90 (around 30 years). 
 
Figure 2.3 Temperature as a function of time and distance for a spent PWR assembly, from 
Arnold et al. (2011). 
The model presented here has deficiencies, but the similar behavior and temperature maximum 
between SNL’s work shown above and the model results suggest that, with some modifications, 
this analytical method can be used to benchmark and verify future numerical models of this 
problem in future work.  
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3. Deep Borehole Design Innovations 
This chapter considers three design changes from the deep borehole reference design: the wire 
rope method of waste canister emplacement, the “telescoping” borehole, and a canister-loading 
process that is tailored to meet the borehole facility’s needs. 
3.1 Wire Rope Emplacement System 
One of the main unanswered design questions is the method by which canisters are reliably and 
quickly emplaced. Three methods of canister emplacement have been proposed. Woodward and 
Clyde Consultants (1983) proposed using a specially-designed rig, similar to the drilling rig, to 
lower canisters to depth by forming a string of linked waste canisters and lowering groups of 
canisters to depth with drill pipe. The SNL group has proposed a similar approach, with a string 
length of 40 canisters having a total length of around 200 meters (Brady et al. 2009). The 
alternate “drop-in” design was proposed by Bates (2011). A waste canister falling down a fluid-
filled borehole has a slow enough terminal velocity (one to two meters per second) that the 
impact of a dropped canister would not damage the fuel canister. Bates performed experiments at 
a reduced scale, demonstrating that the hydraulic roughness of the canisters could be 
manipulated to yield the desired terminal velocity. In other words, the outside of the waste 
canister can be deliberately roughened to slow the descent of the canister. These methods exist at 
polar opposites of the spectrum, ranging from an expensive method of emplacement with a high 
degree of control of the canisters to an inexpensive method with no way to reliably manipulate a 
canister as it descends. A basic schematic of this approach is shown below in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Basic schematic for a wire rope emplacement system, with “guidance casing” in the 
upper region to aid canister descent (shown in black). 
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A cable emplacement system, proposed here, is a third option. This option has recently 
been considered by the group at Sandia National Laboratories, as evidenced by a project update 
by Sassani and Hardin (2015). More accurately referred to as “wire rope,” high-strength cables 
would be spooled near the top of the borehole and would slowly unwind, gently lowering the 
waste canister to the proper depth. A dedicated cable emplacement system would retain the 
modified drilling rig method’s ability to retrieve or manipulate a canister during the 
emplacement process, but would cost less than a rig system. Hoisting systems of long lengths 
(i.e. longer than a kilometer) have been designed for mines in South Africa and elsewhere, 
providing information for best practices and reliability of cable systems operating in similar 
environments to the downhole conditions of a deep borehole (Chaplin 1995, Willemse and 
Schmitz 2010). This section will briefly review the theory of wire ropes as it applies to this 
emplacement system and will propose a preliminary design for a cable emplacement system.  
3.1.1 Wire Rope Design 
A cursory search through available wire rope technology reveals that there are hundreds of wire 
rope designs available for commercial purposes. These designs vary in terms of weave pattern, 
diameter, and material at the core of the rope. The present analysis is less concerned with 
choosing a precise solution than simply proving that some available off-the-shelf technology is 
capable of performing the emplacement task. Consequently, the cable designs and manufacturers 
presented here were arbitrarily chosen and are not meant to be an endorsement of a manufacturer 
or design. Commercially-available wire ropes in a 6x19 configuration (i.e. six intertwined wire 
ropes made of nineteen strands each, shown in Figure 3.1) vary in diameter from 3/16 to 1-1/4 
inches (0.476 cm to 3.175 cm) in one publication, with listed lengths for minimum breaking 
force, cost per foot, and rope weight per foot (Wireco 2013).  
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Figure 3.2 Example configuration for a 6x19 wire rope. 
Many commercially-available wire rope systems are capable of supporting a two-canister 
pair of PWR assemblies and 5 km of wire rope, so the next step is to determine how rope 
diameter affects safety factor and cost. A loaded waste canister containing a single PWR 
assembly is expected to weigh around 8 kN, with the maximum force (“fully loaded”) occurring 
when the rope is fully extended to 5 km depth. All rope diameters above 1/2 inches (1.27 cm) 
have a safety factor above two for the fully loaded case. The safety factor is a ratio between the 
load a system can structurally handle before failure and the load that it is expected to handle 
under normal operating conditions. The safety factor of two chosen here is an acceptable for 
preliminary design work, although more advance analyses in which all factors are accounted for 
can often aim for safety factors less than two. After 7/8 inches, safety factors begin to plateau, as 
shown in Figure 3.3. The strength-to-rope weight ratio in this case is relevant, as the weight of 
the rope is actually the dominant factor at 5 km extension. As shown below, the strength-to-rope 
weight ratio begins to flatten as the rope diameter of this design increases.  
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Figure 3.3 Loaded weight and safety factor vs. rope diameter for loadings at 5 km. 
Another metric of comparison is the cost of a five-kilometer length of wire rope versus 
the safety factor while fully loaded. Table 3.1 shows the wire rope cost for various diameters. 
The cost per unit safety factor is least for diameters which do not achieve the requisite safety 
factor of two. For diameters which have safety factors above two, cost per SF increases. Rope 
diameters of 3/4 inch (1.905 cm) or 7/8 inch (2.222 cm) are the lowest-costing options with the 
requisite safety factors. 
Table 3.1 Rope diameter and cost per 5 km. 
Diameter (in) $ per 5 km 
0.50 $71,000 
0.56 $79,000 
0.62 $91,000 
0.75 $128,000 
0.87 $166,000 
1 $205,000 
1.12 $247,000 
1.25 $291,000 
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If it is determined that a safety factor of two is not sufficient, a larger diameter of rope should be 
used. Requirements for a safety factor above two could be instituted if the canister is expected to 
experience quick drops during its descent of if the consequences of a dropped canister are 
viewed to be particularly severe. Two manufacturers’ large diameter wire rope systems were 
surveyed (CASAR 2003, Southwest Wire Rope LP 2008), yielding the data shown in Table 3.2 
for safety factor versus diameter for a two-canister loading. The two-canister loading is chosen 
here as a conservative estimation, although the additional weight does not make an appreciable 
difference at full extension due to the large weight of the wire rope. As can be seen, larger 
diameter ropes are capable of bearing the emplacement burden with a larger safety factor than 
the smaller-diameter ropes. Above a certain diameter, there is a downward trend in the safety 
factor as the weight of wire rope for a 5 km extension begins to literally outweigh the added 
strength. An additional concern is finding a wire rope drive system that can be moved from 
borehole to borehole, as larger ropes are more difficult to drive. The smaller diameters listed in 
Table 3.2 would probably be sufficient for this purpose.  
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Table 3.2 Rope diameter, weight of full load, and safety factor for larger rope diameters. 
(CASAR 2003, Southwest Wire Rope LP 2008) 
Diameter 
(in) 
Load at Full 
Extension (kN) 
SF 
1.34 296 4.30 
1.42 318 4.32 
1.5 354 4.34 
1.57 391 4.36 
1.65 426 4.37 
1.73 467 4.39 
1.81 511 4.40 
1.89 556 4.41 
1.97 599 4.42 
2.5 862 3.42 
2.63 949 3.41 
2.75 1037 3.40 
2.87 1132 3.39 
3 1227 3.39 
3.13 1329 3.38 
3.25 1438 3.36 
3.37 1548 3.35 
3.5 1672 3.30 
3.75 1912 3.28 
 
The final complicating factor involves choosing a rope diameter which will maintain a 
safety factor greater than two after many cycles and will experience stresses less than the 
Donandt limit, which is a measure of the stress per area exerted on a wire rope at which the wear 
on a rope is markedly increased with use. The Donandt limit is conservatively estimated to be 
300 N/mm2. Wire ropes are projected to lose around fifteen percent of their minimum breaking 
force during the middle portion of their lifetimes (Feyrer 2007). Therefore, the final criteria for 
wire rope diameter choice are a safety factor above two after fifteen percent strength decrease, 
minimized cost per unit strength, and stress less than the Donandt limit. For one-canister 
loadings, 1/2 inch is sufficient to stay within this limit. The weight of the rope is about eighty 
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percent of the total load at full extension. Rope costs would be $71,000 for the one canister case 
and around $147,000 for two canister cases (CASAR 2003, Southwest Wire Rope LP 2008). The 
cost increase stems from the need for a bigger diameter to handle the larger load of two canisters. 
As mentioned above, all of these cases are for a single manufacturer’s 6x19 rope design, and 
other rope designs must be considered in future work. 
3.1.2 Time to Emplacement System Failure 
Wire ropes are analyzed in terms of cycles (i.e. the number of times a rope is loaded and 
unloaded). The safety factor of the rope decreases as a function of the number of cycles (Feyrer 
2007). Two loaded waste canisters weigh approximately 16 kN, requiring that the chosen wire 
rope can support these canisters plus the weight of the rope at full 5 km extension. The times-to-
failure of very deep wire rope systems are not detailed frequently. One case study with a 54 mm 
diameter (2.1 inches) mine hoist rope operating to 4 km depth in a South African gold mine 
required cable maintenance after around 30,000 cycles. The system operated at 15 meters per 
second and hoisted a load much heavier than envisioned here. The mine hoist operated for 57 
months and 402,000 cycles before being discarded. Its predecessor operated 16.7 months and 
116,800 cycles prior to discard (Willemse and Schmitz 2010). These systems, designed to hoist 
large loads of mined ore, are much larger than would be required to lower waste canisters. It 
appears that, with maintenance, wire rope systems for the purpose of waste emplacement would 
remain in service for many years. As a result, it is unlikely that the durability of the cable system 
itself will be a major limiting factor in the safe emplacement of waste. 
3.1.3 Estimating Emplacement Time 
Arnold et al. (2011) estimated that the rig emplacement system would take around 800 total 
hours to emplace a borehole’s worth of waste (160 MT for this design) at a cost of around 
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$3 million. This 800 hour and $3 million dollar estimate serves as the major point of comparison 
for an alternate wire rope-based emplacement system. The time it takes to emplace a single 
canister can be roughly calculated as the sum of four terms: the time to lower the canister to 
depth, the time to return the cable to the surface, the time to prepare and attach a new canister to 
the emplacement system, and the expected amount of time lost to emplacement trouble. 
In reality, the lost time will be concentrated in a handful of emplacements, but can still make a 
noticeable difference in the average emplacement time (SNL 2015).  
The time necessary to safely lower a canister to depth depends on the downward velocity 
of the canister. This velocity is likely close to the terminal free fall velocity of the canister, which 
is approximately 4 m/s in cases where the canister is not deliberately roughened to decrease 
terminal velocity (Bates 2011). The precise terminal velocity is dependent on a variety of 
parameters, including the size of the annulus between canister and casing, the hydraulic 
properties of the fluid filling the borehole, and the hydraulic properties of the canister, which can 
be manipulated to some degree. For instance, it may be possible to construct the borehole with a 
large diameter if the additional space allowed for a faster rate of emplacement (i.e. a faster 
terminal velocity). If a canister were lowered an average of 4 km at 2 m/s, an uninterrupted 
downward trip would take around 30 minutes. The upward speed of long lift systems can be 
faster that the 2 m/s proposed for the downward speed, but for simplicity, it can be assumed that 
the total unwind-rewind time for the cable emplacement system would be around one hour. The 
preparation time to move a waste canister from truck to vertical position over the borehole is 
uncertain and requires future work. 
It is difficult to estimate the extra time added to the process by emplacement trouble. The 
uptime from similar mine hoist systems could begin to inform the reliability of the entire system. 
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This area requires further analysis and can likely be expressed in terms of number of stuck 
canisters and emplacement system failures expected per 400 emplacements (i.e. the capacity of 
one borehole). If the total trip and preparation time were around two hours (i.e. double the one-
hour trip time proposed above), time lost due to emplacement trouble would be need to be 
considered if significant compared to the 800-hour proposed timeline for the rig system without 
emplacement trouble. 
3.2 Telescoping Vertical Borehole 
The telescoping vertical borehole is a slight change to the existing borehole design. With 
telescoping, the disposal zone has a larger upper region and smaller lower region. In a waste-
disposal program which handles both PWR and BWR assemblies, two options have been 
proposed to handle both PWR and BWR fuel without major modifications. The first option 
would consolidate fuel rods by breaking apart assemblies into a denser rod configuration. The 
consolidation of fuel rods, proposed in a 1990 report by the Electric Power Research Institute, is 
unproven at the scale necessary for a deep borehole repository. In consolidation, a spent fuel 
assembly is disassembled into its constituent fuel rods, which are in turn condensed into a 
closely-packed cylinder. Examples of this post-consolidation configuration for the deep borehole 
case can be found in Hoag (2006). Consolidation at the facility scale was considered in a paper 
by Mui and Nutt (2014), who concluded that major engineering advancements must be made to 
utilize rod consolidation technology to the industrial scale and that consolidation (and increased 
packing density) may not necessarily save costs at the facility scale. This would be especially 
true if the consolidation process damaged fuel elements at any appreciable rate. Non-fuel 
assembly components, activated during their time in the nuclear reactor, also require deep 
geological storages. If that storage is in boreholes, then the components have to be compacted to 
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gain any advantage from fuel rod consolidation; and assembly compaction introduces potentially 
problematic large-scale surface operations with highly radioactive materials.  
The second option disposes of spent fuel assemblies directly, eschewing greater packing 
density for simplicity. The diagonal length of a PWR assembly is approximately 30.3 cm, while 
most BWR assemblies have a diagonal length of 19.5 cm. A 45 cm diameter borehole, 
accounting for casing and extra space for clearance during emplacement, would be sufficient to 
store PWR assemblies. Hoag (2006) proposed packing three or even four BWR assemblies side 
by side into a similarly-sized canister as for PWR fuel. The triple-packed BWR canister is only a 
few centimeters larger in diameter than the PWR canister, but each incremental increase in 
diameter pushes drilling technology closer to (or beyond) its limit in terms of diameter at great 
depth. An alternative to the triple-packed BWR approach would be to use smaller canisters 
which contain a single BWR assembly. To best utilize the single-packed BWR canisters, some 
portion of the borehole’s disposal zone would be drilled to a smaller diameter to merely 
accommodate a single BWR assembly. This approach is shown in Figure 3.4. Two 
methodologies are presented below to determine whether telescoping the disposal region could 
be advantageous. 
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Figure 3.4 Telescoping borehole with separate PWR and BWR assembly disposal sections. 
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3.2.1 Telescoping to Achieve Lower Costs 
The 5 km boreholes required for the disposition of nuclear fuel are by no means the deepest 
boreholes ever drilled, but the combination of depth and the relatively large (~50 cm) diameter 
required to accommodate a spent PWR assembly presents a unique challenge. Sandia National 
Laboratories’ comprehensive reports on the updated borehole design (Brady et al. 2009, Arnold 
et al. 2011) have provided cost estimates for borehole construction costs, but these estimates are 
not clearly explained in the text. Without an actual demonstration project for well construction, 
even the best estimates are subject to error.  
Deep wells designed to harness geothermal resources are the other major non-petroleum 
application for deep drilling technology, and they can serve as a cost predictor for deep borehole 
drilling. Polsky et al. (2008), an SNL report concerning the construction of deep geothermal 
wells, provides a method for the estimation of well-drilling costs. The well is divided into 
sections by depth, and each section’s depth and diameter affect the time spent on the three major 
tasks: drilling and enlarging the hole, manipulating equipment at depth (termed “bottom hole 
assembly” in the report), and “tripping,” which is the time it takes to lower and retrieve 
equipment between the surface and the bottom of the hole. Estimation work completed by 
ThermaSource (found in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of Polsky 2008) shows a steady increase in tripping 
times with depth, the magnitude of which quadruples between the second quarter and fourth 
quarter of the well. Drilling and enlarging the hole are not separated into distinct terms in this 
analysis, but drilling and enlarging require separate tools. As a result, a larger borehole diameter 
drilled to great depth is more expensive than the same operation completed at shallower depth, as 
changing between tools takes more time. If the borehole could be drilled to a smaller target 
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diameter at maximum depth, this would save tripping time and presumably the time spent 
widening the borehole as well. This is a more realistic goal for single BWR canisters. 
3.2.2 Telescoping to Achieve Greater Borehole Stability 
A second reason to divide the disposal region of the borehole into two sections would be to 
enhance borehole stability. Removing rock from the borehole during drilling increases the stress 
on the rock in two major ways: the rock near the borehole must now support an increased load 
from the rocks above it, and the borehole must resist deformation from the fluid pressure 
differential at the borehole wall (Bradley 1979). Drilling mud of a specific weight is pumped into 
the well during drilling to balance this pressure differential. Choosing the correct mud weight is 
key, because an error in mud weight on either bound can decrease well stability. If the well is 
underpressured and the mud does not adequately support the walls, the borehole will fail 
(Bradley 1979). For an overpressured borehole, drilling mud will further fracture the rock walls 
and fluid will be lost to the formation (Ito 2001, van Oort 2003). These fractures are undesirable 
for reasons beyond the cost of lost drilling fluid, as fracturing brought on by overpressure can 
cause smaller pieces of rock from the borehole wall to fall into the borehole and damage or 
disable drilling equipment. In a general sense, the pore pressure found in situ can vary 
considerably between strata and with depth, so the mud weight necessary to stabilize, but not 
damage, a borehole varies from location to location and varies by depth at a specific location. An 
extensive treatment of geomechanics in the subsurface can be found in Zoback (2010), and 
strata-by-strata mud weight considerations can be found in many drilling case studies. Once 
casing is inserted, the cased section of the well is stabilized and drilling continues.  
The casing design, i.e. the depths at which drilling is suspended and casing is inserted, is 
determined by the drilling contractor after balancing the desire to use the fewest number of 
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casing intervals with the increased risk of drilling longer stretches without casing upper portions 
first. For deep borehole disposal, the size of each casing run above the disposal zone will be 
determined after site selection. For the disposal zone itself, the most recent design from SNL 
(Arnold et al. 2011) calls for a single casing run for the entire disposal zone. Previous deep 
drilling projects, summarized in a presentation by Chur (2015), have encountered breakout 
problems in which fluid pressure causes pieces of the borehole wall to slough off. Many of these 
problems occurred below the 5 km depth called for in the DBD design, but the larger diameter 
required for SNF disposal may exacerbate the problem at shallower depths. Construction times 
for the deep borehole are upwards of 100 days (Brady et al. 2009, Arnold et al. 2011), meaning 
that the upper portion of the disposal zone (in granite) will be in contact with drilling mud for a 
long period of time, potentially allowing for physical changes to occur brought on by exposure to 
the drilling mud. Van Oort (2003) noted a lubrication effect of drilling muds in shale wells in 
which a sliding effect occurs across fractures lubricated by drilling mud, culminating in rockfall 
into the well. He also noted that limited hydraulic conductivity in the area around the borehole 
creates slow-moving waves of effect from various components of the drilling fluid. For instance, 
the pressure wave from an overpressure moves away from the well at a rate of 0.1 meters per 
day, followed by the diffusion of ions contained within the mud at 0.01 meters per day and actual 
hydraulic flow at 0.001 meters per day. While van Oort focused on shales, similar phenomena of 
time-dependent changes in the rock near the borehole are likely to occur in other media. 
Moos (2001) noted that the time-dependent effects (especially chemical) could eventually cause 
wellbore collapse, even if the well is initially stable. Especially if there is considerable 
inhomogeneity between the top of the disposal region and the bottom, or if time-dependent 
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changes are predicted between drilling and casing, employing a drilling strategy which cases the 
disposal zone in two runs at two different diameters could lead to move positive results. 
3.3 Parallel Loading Process for Borehole-Specific Canisters 
A successful deep borehole repository must not only drill many disposal boreholes, it must also 
accept waste from several transportation cask designs and efficiently transfer SNF assemblies 
into borehole-specific disposal canisters. An inefficient or poorly-designed canister loading and 
completion process could create a bottleneck through which all other activities on site are 
limited. Dry cask loading is the closest analogue to loading disposal canisters. However, the 
requirements for long-term SNF storage in dry casks are different than for immediate disposal, 
and the process could be modified accordingly.  
D’Souza et al. (2015) reported the labor required and total estimated dose received by 
workers in several dry cask loading campaigns at the D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant in 
Michigan. In dry cask loading, the actual movement of assemblies into the cask is a relatively 
small, only accounting for around ten percent of total labor during the casking process. Welding 
and drying account for more than half of the labor in cask loading (and an even greater amount 
when preparation work is excluded). Relevant data for a single cask loading event is reproduced 
from D’Souza et al. (2015) in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Task Time During Dry Cask Loading 
Task # of Workers Duration (hours) 
Total Labor 
(Man-Hours) 
Equipment Prep. 10 12 120 
Fuel Loading 3 20 60 
Decon./Movement 10 5 50 
Welding/Processing 6 50 300 
Overpack Transfer 10 10 100 
Move to ISFSIa 5 5 25 
Total   655 
aISFSI is the Independent Spent Fuel Storage installation, i.e. the dry cask storage pad 
The canister loading process will have several important differences from dry cask 
loading. First and most obvious, the fewer assemblies that are loaded per canister, the greater the 
total number of welds that must be performed. Welding is already a major time consuming 
component of the considerably denser-packed dry cask, so welding would likely account for 
more than half of a DBD canister’s loading time. On the other hand, long-term corrosion of the 
canister from moisture  the canister would pose less of a problem for a very deep borehole than 
for an alternative disposal method that relies more heavily on engineered barriers to radionuclide 
release. It is difficult to determine an adequate answer to this question without the release of 
general borehole repository containment guidelines by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency. SNL’s analysis (Brady et al. 2009, Arnold et al. 2011). Current design approaches do 
not even credit the disposal canister as a barrier to radionuclide release, so the increased 
corrosion rates brought on by limited amounts of water remaining in the canister would not 
affect the safety case. It is worth noting, however, that future iterations of the design, including 
any eventual site license application, would almost certainly credit the disposal canister as 
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delaying radionuclide release to some degree. Therefore, decreased drying time could offset 
some of the extra welding time. Mui and Nutt (2014) and Bechtel SAIC (2005) report an 
estimate of around six hours to move a spent fuel assembly into a canister, dry it, and weld the 
canister shut, excluding time for rod consolidation. Putting three BWR assemblies into a canister 
would likely take slightly more time to load, owing to the extra two fuel movements per canister 
(i.e. two more canisters must be lifted into the canister).  
A parallel processing approach can be utilized to limit the number and length of lifts from 
the transportation canister into the small borehole canisters. The process could occur as follows. 
A “nest” of canisters is built, likely consisting of four or five borehole-specific canisters in a 
larger metal basket. An example of the configuration of such a canister nest is shown below in 
Figure 3.5. The nest could be lifted out of the pool, saving lifts on both sides of the process. The 
nest would serve a secondary purpose to standardize the orientation of canisters so that welding 
and drying processes can be done in parallel or in quick succession. Parallel welding or drying 
would likely require the design of new tools. The time to move equipment towards and away 
from the canisters is not negligible, so even if welding and drying were performed in five 
consecutive steps, it would likely save time over the single canister at a time approach. Work 
performed for Argonne National Laboratory suggests a 40% time savings using a parallel 
processing approach (Nutt 2015). When the decreased stringency in drying is considered 
(stemming from the borehole-specific canisters short lifetime as compared to dry casks), it is 
likely that the quality control required for dry cask loading could be loosened to save time in the 
DBD approach. This approach requires further work to become a serious part of the surface 
facility design. 
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Figure 3.5 Example of a deep borehole canister nest for the purpose of parallel loading 
operations. 
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4. Preliminary Borehole Repository Design, Logistics, and Cost Analysis 
4.1 Introduction  
A consent-based process, recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear 
Future for the siting of new nuclear waste management facilities, could give rise to high-level 
nuclear waste repositories of many designs and sizes (BRC 2012). While previous efforts in the 
United States focused on three geologic environments, volcanic tuff, salt, and basalt 
(NWPA 1982), research programs worldwide have also focused on disposal in granitic rock 
(SKB 2011), clay (NAGRA 2002), and deep boreholes (Juhlin et al. 1998, NIREX 2004). 
By expanding the list of candidate designs, a larger number of communities may participate in a 
future siting process. A repository could limit the acceptance of waste to a regional subset of the 
national fleet or accept waste on a contractual basis from individual utilities or power plants, 
creating new scenarios for logistical and economic analysis. In addition to spent fuel, a 
repository could also accept a variety of defense wastes, including cesium and strontium capsules 
from Hanford as recently proposed by the Department of Energy (SNL 2014). One of these 
possible scenarios, a regional deep borehole repository in the Midwestern United States, is 
considered in this chapter. This chapter reports the results of an integrated system analysis for a 
regional deep borehole disposal (DBD) repository shared by Illinois and its surrounding states. 
A regional repository approach is potentially interesting in part because it can reduce both total 
national system transportation costs and related political resistance to spent fuel transportation. 
Also, in a consent-based process, state with a comparatively large portion of the nation’s spent 
fuel stakeholders may see advantages to expeditious disposal in a repository taking mostly its 
own states waste while being leary of future possible national pressures to compromise consent 
basis if it is expected to be the sole recipient of all U.S. commercial spent fuel. 
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A waste handling and canister loading facility, in the present analysis assumed to be co-located 
with the repository, would accept fuel transported from reactor sites and perform handling 
operations. This chapter will first discuss the regional spent fuel inventory, DBD facility 
characteristics, throughput, and acceptance strategies that serve as inputs for the fuel logistics 
and cost simulator TSL-CALVIN (Nutt et al. 2012). CALVIN analyzes various proposed 
iterations of a nationwide SNF acceptance program and estimates a range of system metrics, 
including utility dry storage costs, fuel handling costs, and a transportation schedule for use in 
CALVIN’s sister program TSL-TOM (Busch and Howard 2012). TOM calculates the number 
and estimates cost of assets that would be required for different strategies and the cost of 
operating the transportation system. Results analyzed include rough economic estimates for 
facility costs and equipment requirements, culminating in a unit cost per metric ton for a regional 
deep borehole repository and a simplified cost estimate for emplacement costs. 
4.2 Borehole Surface Facility Design 
In order to perform any meaningful analysis of the deep borehole concept as a solution to 
commercial spent nuclear fuel disposal, several questions left unanswered by previous reports 
must be answered—at least in preliminary form—to produce meaningful results. These questions 
include the rates at which fuel will be transported and disposed and the design of the surface 
facility. The case study presented in this chapter deals with a subset of the national spent fuel 
inventory, but the analysis could be scaled up to the national inventory. The national case would 
simply require more boreholes, a longer total waste acceptance and emplacement time, and 
larger facilities to process greater throughput. The primary design elements of the surface facility 
pertain to canister loading and emplacement, with special attention paid to how fuel moves 
through the facility from its arrival at the facility to its trip to the bottom of the borehole. This 
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section will consider the major facility characteristics and provide a more in-depth look at the 
canister loading process. The process considered here accepts fuel in a variety of interim storage 
containers and repackages it into the borehole-specific disposal canister. It is worth noting that 
an alternative approach could load borehole-specific canisters at reactor sites prior to transport, 
although for simplicity that approach is not considered here. 
The canister-loading facility accepts spent fuel from transportation casks and outputs a 
steady stream of disposal-ready canisters as described above. The facility is designed to operate 
at steady state throughout the entire year, although fuel will likely arrive by truck and rail in 
bursts over some fraction of the year. Transportation canisters will be moved onto a small pad 
designed for lag storage, from which the canister-loading facility will draw. Canisters will be 
submerged in a transfer pool and opened. On the other side of the transfer pool, a nest holding 
five empty canisters will also be submerged. The nest holds the five canisters in place for future 
steps and can be lifted in order to move multiple canisters at once. It is not meant for any storage 
or transport purposes and is re-usable. Assemblies are moved from the transportation cask to 
their places in the empty canisters. For efficiency, it might be preferable to submerge two 
canister nests, so there will always been empty disposal canisters available to fully unload the 
transportation cask. The nest will ideally allow quick sequential or parallel processing of the set 
of five canisters for drying, welding, and inspection operations. Considerable time savings per 
canister are anticipated. In addition, it may be possible (if not rod consolidation is performed), to 
transfer assemblies in dry conditions directly from the spent fuel transfer cask to the disposal 
canister. This approach warrants future consideration. 
Excluding preparation time and planning, each assembly takes roughly 30 minutes to 
move. After the canisters are filled, the nest is removed from the pool. For canisters to be placed 
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in storage, drying the assemblies is a long process. Borehole canisters will not be stored for an 
extended period of time, so perfectly drying the inside of the canisters is not necessary. Drying 
times for larger dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) during a 2012 dry cask loading campaign at 
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Generating Station (Bridgman, MI) ranged between four and six hours 
(D’Souza et al. 2015). Six hours can be considered as the upper limit for drying time, which 
would likely occur for all assemblies in parallel. After drying, lids are lowered onto the canisters 
for welding. These lids could have an integrated eyehole for attachment to emplacement systems, 
or those parts could be welded on using a second lid that sits on top of the first. Welding for the 
DPCs at Cook took 50 hours per cask, although the size, number, and complexity of the welds 
for a DPC are much larger. Given the consistency in canister size and location and the large 
number of repetitions, any process (manual or automatic) would be optimized and 50 hours for 
the five canisters would also be an upper limit, even including a secondary lid for handling 
purposes. For the five-canister nest, welding could likely be accomplished in half that time (Nutt 
2015). After welding, the welds and canisters must be inspected. A conservative estimate for the 
total process would likely be between 30 and 40 hours of work, with slightly longer times for the 
triple BWR canister because of the two additional fuel moves per canister. This translates to a 
processing time of six to eight hours per canister, which is consistent with estimates for 
similarly-sized canisters. After completion, canisters could be stored underwater or in a 
temporary overpack that covers the nest. Individual canisters could be immediately loaded onto 
on-site transportation trucks for transportation to the borehole or placed upright on a second lag 
store pad for pickup. For heat management issues with high burnup fuel not yet cooled enough 
by aging, the overpack might need active cooling to keep canister temperatures low. Using a 
labor cost range of $1,000 to $1,400 per hour, handling fees per canister would range from 
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$6,000 to $11,200. This is similar to the loading cost estimate from SNL of $8,400, although that 
estimate also includes assembly consolidation but does not include a $1,000 per canister cost for 
welding (Arnold et al. 2011). SNL’s estimate corresponds with the low end of the labor cost 
range estimates above. Waste canister materials costs were estimated by SNL as $8,300 per 
canister. At approximately $16,700 per canister, canister and canister loading costs would be 
about $6.7 million per borehole or $42,000 per metric ton (MT) of fuel. These estimates will be 
incorporated into the integrated systems cost estimate later in this chapter. 
4.3 TSL-CALVIN Logistics Model Description and Model Inputs 
CALVIN’s database and input parameters were adapted to the regional subset. This section will 
discuss the necessary adjustments, including identifying and estimating the spent fuel inventory 
at reactors in the proposed region, parameters for a DBD facility, transportation rates, and 
acceptance priority. A list of scenarios at the end of this section will summarize the regional 
cases tested. 
4.3.1 Defining the Midwest Region and Spent Fuel Inventory 
The state of Illinois has more than ten percent of the current inventory of commercial spent 
nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States (Ewing et al. 2009, Werner 2012). Roughly 9,000 metric 
tons of spent fuel is at 11 operating reactors on six sites, two closed reactors, and a wet interim 
storage facility located at a planned but never operated reprocessing plant near Morris, IL. Four 
states that border Illinois have smaller nuclear fleets. Iowa and Missouri only have one operating 
reactor each, Wisconsin has two, and Michigan has four. There are also several closed or 
decommissioned reactors with waste on site in Illinois and surrounding states. These “stranded” 
sites, with spent fuel stored on site with no operating reactor, are discussed in Ewing et al. 
(2009). With total operating times of 60 years for the reactors still operational at the end of 2015, 
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the total estimated spent fuel discharge from the chosen states, about 27,000 MT, would be 
substantially larger than planned repositories individually in Sweden and Finland. In short, the 
spent fuel burden shared by these states could be large enough to justify a regional repository. 
This group of states (Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Michigan, and Illinois) will be referred to as the 
“Midwestern Region” or “MR.” To compare the Midwestern Region to other options, two other 
groupings will be considered. These groupings are the “Midwestern Region Plus” (MR+) and the 
entire United States (as considered in other work by Argonne National Lab). The MR+ will 
include all of the fuel from the MR and fuel from an additional set of reactors in nearby states, 
including Wolf Creek, KS, Cooper and Fort Calhoun, NE, Arkansas Nuclear One, AR, and 
Monticello and Prairie Island, MN. If all operating reactors finish their sixty-year lifetimes, the 
MR+ region will contain 35,000 MT of spent fuel (Nutt et al. 2012). Cooper and Monticello 
already have some inventory in interim wet storage Morris, IL facility. Including Cooper and 
Monticello in the MR+ region simplifies the division of responsibility for that site. A map 
visualizing the MR and MR+ regions is shown below in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Map showing the Midwestern Region states (orange) and the additional states 
included in the Midwestern Region Plus (blue). The star represents an arbitrarily-chosen 
repository location. 
An approximation of the recently existing spent fuel inventory by state can be found in a 
2012 Congressional Research Service paper by James Werner, current through the end of 2011 
(Werner 2012). The five states in the proposed Midwest Region (IL, WI, MI, MO, and IA) 
contain around twenty percent of the nation’s spent fuel, while the larger MR+ contains about 
twenty-five percent of the national inventory. The totals by state are listed in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 2011 Spent Fuel Inventory in Selected States (Werner 2012). 
State Inventory (MT) in 2011 State 
Inventory (MT) in 
2011 
Iowa 476 
  
Illinois 8,691 Arkansas 1,333 
Michigan 2560 Kansas 646 
Missouri 679 Minnesota 1,203 
Wisconsin 1,334 Nebraska 853 
MR Total 13,740 MR+ Total 17,775 
 
Inventories by reactor site were published in a 1995 Energy Information Administration report, 
current through 1995 (EIA 1998). With the exception of a small number of assemblies at 
Palisades, all assemblies remained in wet storage at the time of publication in 1998. CALVIN’s 
database contains an approximation of dry storage inventory by reactor at the beginning of waste 
acceptance in 2030, as shown in Table 4.2. To put these numbers in perspective, Figure 4.2 
shows selected state inventories alongside the projected inventory for other national repository 
programs.  
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Figure 4.2 Projected spent fuel inventory for selected US states and other countries (Feiveson et 
al. 2011, Werner 2012) 
 
Table 4.2 Approximate Dry Storage Inventory in 2030 (Nutt et al. 2012) 
Reactor 2030 Dry Inventory (MT) Reactor 
2030 Dry Inventory 
(MT) 
ANO 1,348 
  
Big Rock Point 58 Kewaunee 517 
Braidwood 853 LaCrosse 38 
Byron 962 LaSalle 1,041 
Callaway 227 Monticello 309 
Clinton 452 Palisades 684 
Cooper 353 Point Beach 759 
DC Cook 930 Prairie Island 837 
Dresden 1,388 Quad Cities 1,319 
Duane Arnold 453 Wolf Creek 30 
Fermi 292 Zion 1,019 
Fort Calhoun 255 Total 14,124 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Sweden Illinois Finland Pennsylvania Germany South Carolina
SN
F 
In
ve
n
to
ry
 (
M
TH
M
)
45 
 
The future of nuclear power in the United States is uncertain over both the short and long terms, 
ranging from premature closure of many reactors in the fleet to the replacement or expansion of 
existing generation capacity with time. The middle case treated here sees existing reactors finish 
their sixty-year lifetimes. An approximate breakdown by reactor (assuming 60-year lifetimes) is 
shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Estimated spent fuel inventories for selected locations at end-of-life (Nutt et al. 2012) 
Plant Estimated Inventory (MT) Plant 
Estimated Inventory 
(MT) 
ANO 2,429 
  
Big Rock Point 58 Morris 674 
Braidwood 2,875 Kewaunee 517 
Byron 2,904 LaCrosse 38 
Callaway 1,643 LaSalle 3,227 
Clinton 1,570 Monticello 693 
DC Cook 2,893 Palisades 1,068 
Cooper 866 Point Beach 1,422 
Dresden 2,451 Prairie Island 1,437 
Duane Arnold 946 Quad Cities 2,729 
Fermi 1,349 Wolf Creek 1,541 
Fort Calhoun 681 Zion 1,019 
MR Total 27,384 MR+ Total 35,032 
 
4.3.2 Borehole Repository Description 
Deep boreholes were first considered during early waste disposal research by the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences (National Academy of Sciences 1957). The current concept for a deep 
borehole repository stems from work in the 1970s and 1980s by the Office of Nuclear Waste 
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Isolation (ONWI), the national research program that laid the groundwork for many nuclear 
waste disposal concepts. This program led to two major reports on deep borehole disposal by 
O’Brien et al. (1979) at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and by Woodward-Clyde 
Consultants (1983). Many elements of the original design have been preserved in recent work at 
Sandia National Laboratories, the University of Sheffield under Fergus Gibb, Sweden’s disposal 
organization SKB, and MIT. Sandia produced an updated reference design for the deep borehole 
concept (Arnold et al. 2011), adapting Woodward-Clyde’s design to account for modernized 
drilling practices and new economic realities. SNL’s design, excluding the consolidation of fuel 
assemblies, serves as the basis for the economic estimates presented in a later section. SNL’s 
reference design is a 4 to 5 km vertical borehole with at least the bottom 2 km in crystalline 
basement rock (granite), cased throughout during emplacement. Waste is emplaced in the bottom 
2 km of the well. The internal diameter of the disposal region is large enough to accommodate a 
canister containing a single PWR assembly or a denser configuration of consolidated fuel rods of 
approximately the same size. Each borehole contains a nominal number of 400 canisters, stacked 
vertically, equivalent to 253 MT in the consolidated case or 160 MT of unconsolidated spent fuel 
assemblies (Hoag 2006). The base case described here will choose to dispose of assemblies in 
their un-altered configuration, so the standard borehole will contain 160 MT of spent fuel. The 
SNL design work estimated a total cost per borehole of $40 million (2011$) and a completion 
time of six months. The $40 million estimate includes all borehole-related operations, including 
the consolidation of spent fuel and the cost of canisters. As a result, this estimate may be slightly 
larger than the estimate for the base case described here. For BWR assemblies, a triangularly-
packed canister would have a similar diameter to the PWR assembly, likely contributing some 
extra cost for a marginally wider borehole diameter. Based on SNL’s estimates, a single drilling 
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rig could make space for 320 MT of unconsolidated spent fuel per year, meaning that all other 
parts of the facility must process around 27 MT per month per drilling rig. Spent fuel will arrive 
on-site in dual-purpose canisters or bare fuel canisters (depending on scenario) and spend a small 
amount of time on a lag storage pad prior to repacking into borehole-specific canisters. Bare fuel 
canisters are reusable transportation canisters, which are not designed for long-term storage. 
The transportation schedule has been chosen such that the annual rate of fuel transportation is 
equal to the annual rate of disposal, eliminating the need for a true interim storage or spent fuel 
aging facility. 
The canister design with have an outside diameter of 32 cm for the PWR case and 37 cm 
for the BWR case. These canisters will be adequate for all spent fuel assemblies in the region, 
with the exception of BWR fuel from LaCrosse and Big Rock Point, which is too large to fit in 
the proposed BWR canister in the triple-packed configuration (EIA 1998). These larger BWR 
assemblies are relatively few in number and can simply be packaged as PWR assemblies at a 
slightly less efficient packing density. The estimated cost per canister fabrication, loading, and 
completion is $16,700, which translates to $6.7 million per borehole or $42,000 per MT of fuel. 
An independent analysis of SNL’s cost-per-canister estimate (Brady et al. 2009) yielded similar 
results. 
4.3.3 Transportation and Logistics Parameters 
The transportation parameters required for analysis by CALVIN vary depending on the case. 
These variations include the size of the region (MR vs. MR+ vs. national), the order in which 
fuel is queued for transportation to the repository (termed “acceptance priority”), the annual rate 
of fuel transportation and disposal, and whether or not re-usable bare fuel canisters are permitted 
for reactor-to-repository transportation. Acceptance priority can be determined via many factors, 
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but the most economic (and, perhaps, most politically attractive) strategies prioritize the removal 
of spent fuel from decommissioned reactors first. This “stranded fuel” can be transported to the 
repository within the first several years of operation. After stranded fuel is dealt with, the 
acceptance priority transitions to operating reactors. The most economic strategy attempts to 
prevent additional dry casks from being loaded by accepting spent fuel directly from the spent 
fuel pool, although slower rates of annual disposal cannot completely prevent the use of 
additional dry casks. CALVIN’s default setting removes the oldest spent fuel first. A more 
detailed analysis could consider the relative benefits of mixing old and more freshly-discharged 
spent fuel to balance heat loads in the repository. Additionally, the transportation of damaged 
fuel assemblies and their treatment between reactor and disposal must be explored in more detail 
in future work. The annual fuel acceptance and disposal rate of the facility ranges from 500 
MT/year to 1,750 MT/year, depending on the case. When possible, each acceptance rate and 
chosen region were analyzed with and without the use of bare fuel canisters. The scenarios tested 
are listed below in Table 4.4. Cases marked DS-SD only remove fuel from reactor sites after the 
reactor has shut down. 
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Table 4.4 Scenario numbers with description (Scenario names and numbers provided for 
CALVIN users) 
Scenario 
Number 
Scenario Description 
22053 DBD-1 MR Cans only at 500MT/year 
22054 DBD-2 MR Cans only at 750MT/year 
22055 DBD-3 MR Cans only at 1000MT/year 
22056 DBD-4 MR Cans only at 1250MT/year 
22057 DBD-5 MR Cans only at 1500MT/year 
22058 DBD-6 MR Cans and Bare at 500MT/year 
22059 DBD-7 MR Cans and Bare at 750MT/year 
22060 DBD-8 MR Cans and Bare at 1000MT/year 
22061 DBD-9 MR Cans and Bare at 1250MT/year 
22062 DBD-10 MR Cans and Bare at 1500MT/year 
22063 DBD-11 MR Cans only at 1000MT/year DS-SD 
22064 DBD-12 MR+ Cans only at 1000MT/year 
22065 DBD-13 MR+ Cans only at 1250MT/year 
22066 DBD-14 MR+ Cans only at 1500MT/year 
22067 DBD-15 MR+ Cans only at 1750MT/year 
22068 DBD-16 MR+ Cans and Bare at 1500MT/year 
22069 DBD-17 MR+ Cans and Bare at 1500MT/year DS-SD 
2000 (Base) FY15 Base Case (140,000 MT) for National Inventory 
 
4.4 TSL-CALVIN Model Results 
Once the inputs are set, the scenarios listed in the previous section were run with CALVIN and 
TOM. Table 4.5 summarizes the cost per MT of fuel for each of the scenarios. In order to be 
compared to the national base case, costs include utility costs, transportation costs, and canister 
costs, but not disposal costs (as these are not comparable between cases). 
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Table 4.5 Summary of results for different transportation cases with explanation 
Scenario 
Number 
Scenario Description 
Utility + Transport+ 
Canister Loading 
Cost per MT 
2000 (Base) FY15 Base Case (140,000 MT) $52,000,000,000 $371,000 
22068 
DBD-16 MR+ Cans and Bare at 
1500MT/year 
$16,324,907,555 $465,000 
22066 
DBD-14 MR+ Cans only at 
1500MT/year 
$16,595,057,031 $472,000 
22067 
DBD-15 MR+ Cans only at 
1750MT/year 
$16,690,987,953 $475,000 
22062 
DBD-10 MR Cans and Bare at 
1500MT/year 
$13,230,169,236 $484,000 
22061 
DBD-9 MR Cans and Bare at 
1250MT/year 
$13,458,196,699 $492,000 
22057 
DBD-5 MR Cans only at 
1500MT/year 
$13,721,803,009 $502,000 
22056 
DBD-4 MR Cans only at 
1250MT/year 
$13,910,315,276 $509,000 
22060 
DBD-8 MR Cans and Bare at 
1000MT/year 
$14,013,067,276 $513,000 
22065 
DBD-13 MR+ Cans only at 
1000MT/year 
$18,037,144,277 $514,000 
22069 
DBD-17 MR+ Cans and Bare at 
1500MT/yr DS-SD 
$18,310,778,488 $521,000 
22063 
DBD-11 MR Cans only at 
1000MT/year DS-SD 
$14,248,944,953 $522,000 
22064 
DBD-12 MR+ Cans only at 
1000MT/year 
$18,459,323,162 $526,000 
22055 
DBD-3 MR Cans only at 
1000MT/year 
$14,650,785,029 $537,000 
22059 
DBD-7 MR Cans and Bare at 
750MT/year 
$15,536,191,952 $570,000 
22054 
DBD-2 MR Cans only at 
750MT/year 
$16,147,050,822 $591,000 
22058 
DBD-6 MR Cans and Bare at 
500MT/year 
$19,158,732,561 $702,000 
22053 
DBD-1 MR Cans only at 
500MT/year 
$19,617,885,923 $719,000 
 
To complete the full economic analysis, it is necessary to estimate the cost of the deep borehole 
system for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The more recent estimates for this design come 
from SNL, specifically Arnold et al. (2011). Borehole construction, emplacement, and 
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completion costs are estimated at $213,921 per MT of fuel, adapted for the case of 
unconsolidated fuel. These estimates are summarized in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Cost estimates per borehole from Arnold et al. (2011) in 2014$. 
Expense Cost $ per MTa 
Construction $28,728,166 $179,551 
Emplacement $2,920,536 $18,253b 
Sealing $2,578,645 $16,117 
Total $34,227,346 $213,921 
aAdapted for 160 MT boreholes for assembly disposal. 
bThis number is considered in more detail in section 4.6. 
 
Table 4.7 shows the full repository system cost estimate (from utility costs to repository closure), 
proposed repository capacity, and cost per metric ton. 
 
Table 4.7 Cost comparison between published cost values for the Yucca Mountain (DOE 2008) 
Repository and the best system cases for regional deep borehole disposal.  
 
Repository System 
Cost (2014$)a Capacity $ per MT 
MR DBD $18,900,810,149 27,300 MT $692,337 
MR+ DBD $21,245,731,585 35,100 MT $605,291 
Yucca Mountain $106,608,883,072 140,000 MT $761,492 
aIncludes $5 billion expense for borehole site characterization 
 
Finally, Table 4.8 shows comparative unit costs for the two regional deep borehole cases and the 
FY15 averages performed for the entire nation using CALVIN. As the scenarios presented for 
the DBD cases are somewhat idealized, they are actually more comparable to the best 25% of 
simulations run for the entire national inventory, and this is reflected below. 
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Table 4.8 Pre-repository cost comparison between TSL-CALVIN-based analysis for national 
and regional reactor fleets, in 2014 dollars 
 
$ per MT 
Regional Average $536,323 
MR Average $558,419 
MR+ Average $495,813 
FY15 Average $476,124 
FY15 Bottom Quartile $415,922 
 
4.5 Discussion on the Feasibility of a Regional Borehole Repository 
The lowest-cost cases are those that allowed transportation in bare fuel canisters, which was an 
expected result also seen in the national analysis. The conventional wisdom of economies of 
scale holds true in that the larger MR+ region had a cheaper unit cost (7% difference) than the 
MR region. 
Each region has an optimal annual transportation rate (1,500MT/year for the MR+ case), and 
going over this annual rate actually increases costs. Transportation rates above the optimal level 
do not re-use transportation canisters as many times as slower rates, while less than optimal rates 
do not remove fuel from reactors quickly enough and suffer from larger utility-side storage costs. 
The target facility completion time of 25 years (i.e. 1,500MT/year) was cheaper than the original 
cost of 30 years (1,000MT/year). Location of the repository was moved by 140 miles (225 km) 
north to test the cost sensitivity of the chosen location in central Illinois, but the average costs per 
MT were indistinguishable for all cases. 
Using the same methods as the plethora of national cases calculated each year, the 
regional DBD approach proposed here was found to be more expensive than the national fleet, 
but not dramatically larger. The approximately 25% difference between the national case’s 
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bottom quartile and the better cases for the regional approach was small enough that this 
approach could be considered on its other merits, potentially providing a more palatable political 
solution or faster implementation. The cost differences shown in Table 4.7, which appear 
favorable to DBD in comparison to Yucca Mountain, are likely a result in cost inflation in the 
2008 Total System Life Cycle Cost (TSLCC) for Yucca Mountain (DOE 2008) as compared to 
the relatively unproven estimates found in SNL’s 2011 paper (Arnold et al. 2011). The borehole 
case also has the benefit of a pay-as-you-go organization, which means that fuel can be disposed 
as it is received and that the facility is constructed incrementally. In practice, this eliminates the 
need for a large interim storage facility and offers some cost savings in that area. However, if an 
interim storage facility were sited outside of the Midwest and a large amount of fuel was 
removed from the region, it would likely increase transportation costs enough to make a regional 
repository an unattractive option. Whether this suggestion holds up against more detailed 
analysis is a potential question for future work. 
4.6 Emplacement Costs 
In addition to the estimates provided by SNL in Arnold et al. (2011), more recent work for the 
deep borehole field test proposed by the DOE for the disposal of cesium and strontium capsules 
has yielded some more accurate cost data for the disposal of waste canisters in the borehole 
environment. SNL (2015) considered both drill rig and wireline emplacement strategies, as the 
cost per borehole of these two options are reported in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. SNL’s 2015 study is 
for the emplacement of cesium and strontium canisters with highly conservative handling times 
and daylight operations. 
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Table 4.9 Wireline emplacement costs per borehole (SNL 2015) 
Item  Unit Cost Number of Units Total Cost 
Wireline Unit $37,000/day 430 $15,910,000  
Crane $6,000/day 430 $2,580,000  
Bridge Plug $260,000/plug 10 $2,600,000  
Pad and Shield $450,000/borehole 1 $450,000  
Blowout Preventer $2,500/day 430 $1,075,000  
    Total $22,615,000a  
a$141,300 per MT 
Table 4.10 Modified drilling rig emplacement costs per borehole (SNL 2015) 
Item Unit Cost Number of Units Total Cost 
Rig Unit $82,000/day 430 $35,260,000  
Crane $6,000/day 430 $2,580,000  
Bridge Plug $50,000/plug 10 $500,000  
Pad and Shield $600,000/borehole 1 $600,000  
Blowout Preventer $2,500/day 430 $1,075,000  
    Total $40,015,000a  
a$250,000 per MT 
As can be seen above, the wireline emplacement system is a less expensive option. 
A primary reason for this is that, while the rig system is projected to have a higher probability of 
incident-free emplacement (99.22% for 400 emplacements) versus the probability for wireline 
emplacement (96.81%), the presence of more radioactive material (40 canisters for the rig 
instead of one canister for the wireline) increases the cost per accident (SNL 2015) for 
emplacement by rig system. In other words, while a wireline system will have more 
emplacement incidents over the course of the operation of the borehole facility, these incidents 
will cost less money. 
As can be seen, the cost estimates for emplacement are roughly an order of magnitude 
higher than those predicted by the 2011 SNL study (Arnold et al. 2011). Part of this cost 
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difference is obvious: the rental (instead of ownership) of equipment and the limitation of 
emplacement operations to daylight hours will undoubtedly drive up the costs. In addition, the 
averaging of the cost of accident scenarios over the entire emplacement may also be responsible 
for some of this increase in estimated cost. At an actual borehole facility, the combined factors of 
ownership of emplacement equipment and “learning by doing,” in which workers become more 
skilled (and therefore faster) at performing a task, may yield an emplacement cost in between the 
high and low estimates. 
4.7 Summary 
The integrated systems analysis presented in this chapter was meant to provide preliminary 
logistics and cost estimates for a regional deep borehole repository in the Midwestern United 
States. This analysis used the same programs (TSL-CALVIN and TSL-TOM), databases, and 
methodology as the broader national interim storage and repository program with borehole-
specific additions. CALVIN estimates dry cask costs and costs at the interim storage facility 
(ISF) and repository, and TOM takes scheduling information from CALVIN to estimate 
transportation system costs. With an estimated pre-repository cost of $500,000 per MT in 
selected (“best”) cases, a regional borehole repository would be roughly 25% more expensive 
than a national case, owing to the smaller scale and less re-use of transportation equipment and 
handling facilities. Deep borehole disposal is, on paper, cheaper than the mined repository 
option, so a regional deep borehole repository would reach competitiveness with the national 
project partially on the basis of repository choice. Even if the regional repository option is 
economical, however, political questions remain. As with many other alternative repository 
ideas, federal laws must be amended to allow for options that do not include Yucca Mountain as 
a first repository. In theory, the regional facility sacrifices some efficiency for political feasibility 
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and simplicity in transportation, as only one state which is not a stakeholder in the MR and MR+ 
cases will have fuel transported through the state. The assumption that a state and local 
community already favorable to nuclear power will be favorable to a consent-based siting 
process may not hold up, although this connection holds true elsewhere in the world. Another 
political issue would be the ownership of fuel at the GE Morris ISFSI, as two reactors outside of 
the defined regions (San Onofre 1 and Haddam Neck) have fuel in storage there. It is not clear 
how the ownership of these spent fuel assemblies would be handled if the national inventory 
were divided into multiple regional repositories and the fuel from these two reactors had a 
different destination than the U.S. Midwest. 
Future work can focus on logical expansions of this concept. This could include applying 
the regional storage approach to other regions or proposing utility-driven approaches in which 
larger nuclear utilities move towards interim storage for their reactors. Defense wastes, originally 
a one-tenth share of the Yucca Mountain project, are an additional option to decrease costs for 
the regional borehole case. Many defense-related waste forms can be disposed of in deep 
boreholes, including but not limited to cesium and strontium capsules. These waste forms could 
be accepted by a regional facility on a contractual basis, as could any out-of-region spent fuel 
(presumably at a higher cost). These scenarios require further analysis. The canister loading and 
design process should be covered more completely in a future work, although the estimate for 
canister loading cost range is close to SNL’s estimate. Across the board, the general assumption 
of higher-than-average unit costs for the region facility is verified. 
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5. Preliminary Failure and Risk Analysis for Deep Borehole Construction 
and Completion 
5.1 Introduction and Proposed System Fault Tree 
In any deep borehole disposal deployment, many boreholes must be drilled, cased, filled, and 
sealed successfully. An area of ongoing research is the failure of the deep borehole system, as 
well as the operator’s responses to the failure. Unlike in a geologic repository where shallower 
depths and larger spaces allow for human interaction with failed components, the depth of many 
potential failures in a borehole system would make direct reparative action difficult or 
impossible. This chapter focuses on deep borehole-specific failures, encompassing the period of 
time from the beginning of drilling operations, to the closure of well, to events that could impact 
the long-term performance of the borehole seal. Borehole-specific failure can be divided into 
four categories: failure during drilling, casing failure, failure during emplacement, and seal 
installation failure. Failure after seal installation can be divided into natural and anthropogenic 
initiating events. This chapter will discuss these potential modes of failure, first focusing on the 
construction and emplacement stages of a borehole and then considering post-closure events. 
With each mode of failure, potential responses will be proposed, ranging from minor repairs to 
abandonment-in-place. Unlike a geologic repository, whose construction has a nearly guaranteed 
chance of success (because near-surface conditions afford a high degree of certainty in 
construction and emplacement), individual boreholes may require design modifications because 
of failure during construction or emplacement. Design modifications which change the capacity 
of a borehole will be accounted for at the facility scale as planned excess capacity. 
Figure 5.2, shown at the end of the chapter, is a general fault tree for facility construction 
and operation, which can be divided into four areas related to the failure of well construction, 
casing, emplacement, and sealing. The area of the fault tree that requires the most additional 
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detail is failure during emplacement, which is dependent on the chosen mode of emplacement. 
As discussed in a previous section, this chapter considers two potential emplacement systems 
(rig-based and cable-based), each with different failure modes. Figures 5.1a and 5.21 are general 
fault trees for the two different emplacement systems. 
 
Figure 5.1a Fault tree for rig-based emplacement system failure. 
 
Figure 5.1b Fault tree for cable-based emplacement system failure. 
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“Stuck canister” appears in the fault trees for all three systems, but responses to each 
situation will vary by emplacement method, as do the various ways that the system itself can fail. 
The failure of emplacement systems will be discussed later in this section. Finally, many events 
could occur in the hundreds or thousands of years after closure. Such events could compromise 
the containment of the waste inside the borehole, ranging from natural events that could alter the 
geologic containment properties of the host rock to human intrusion for a variety of purposes. 
Post-closure events will be considered at the end of the chapter. While many of these events are 
also present in risk assessment for geologic repositories, the likelihood of certain initiating events 
would likely be lower in the borehole facility, as depth would isolate the facility from many 
surface events and human intrusion, and the facility location would be chosen for seismic 
stability. 
5.2 Failure During Drilling 
There are two major modes of failure during the drilling process: borehole collapse and the 
failure of the drilling rig. The collapse of a borehole during drilling is a major concern in the oil 
industry, and this concern carries over into non-petroleum boreholes for nuclear waste storage, 
waste injection, or geothermal power. Well collapses represent a considerable annual expense to 
the petroleum industry, as many collapsed wells must be abandoned or modified to accommodate 
the collapse, creating considerable delays and expense. More conservative drilling strategies may 
be employed to increase the probability of success, but conservative strategies often require more 
exploratory work and lengthier drilling times. A balance must be struck between acceptable risk 
and the cost of decreasing drilling risk. The other mode of failure, failure of the drilling rig, 
covers any event in which the drilling process is halted. 
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5.2.1 Borehole Collapse 
The primary control systems to prevent borehole collapse are drilling mud weight adjustment 
and the insertion of casing. When rock is removed during the drilling process, the remaining rock 
must support an increased load to prevent collapse. Additionally, hydraulic pressure from the 
formation applies inward pressure on the borehole wall. These forces must be opposed by 
pressure from fluid (drilling mud) pumped into the well until the well is cased. For a long length 
of uncased borehole, the pressure necessary to stabilize the well at the top of the uncased section 
is not the same as the pressure necessary at the bottom, especially if the section spans multiple 
rock units with different properties. Under-pressure will lead to a well collapse and overpressure 
can fracture the formation, leading to structural weakening around the borehole and other 
problems. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, fractures created by overpressure can transmit 
drilling fluid into the formation, which can further weaken the borehole walls, further 
exacerbating the problem. While many sedimentary rocks can deform plastically when subjected 
to pressure from fluid injection, more rigid rocks like granite have a tendency to undergo brittle 
fracture, leading to uneven walls and chunks of rock falling onto the drill bit from above. If the 
borehole is not cased, major unevenness at the borehole wall could also contribute to 
emplacement difficulties. The points at which drilling is halted and the well is cased divide the 
borehole into zones, each with a tight range of mud weight tailored to that particular zone’s 
needs. An example of this division by mud weight can be found in Moos et al. (2003). 
Each run of casing adds cost to the well, so drillers must determine the appropriate level 
of risk to accept in exchange for a decreased number of casing runs. Safety margins can be 
improved by characterizing the rock strata on site before drilling wells and by casing more 
frequently. For the deep borehole nuclear waste storage application, the site should be well-
characterized and major “trouble spots” should be identified during the early stages of operation. 
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The “telescoping borehole,” as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, could be another way to 
reduce the risk of collapse by dividing the 2 km-long disposal region of the borehole into large 
bore and small bore sections, allowing for a casing run to be completed midway through the 
disposal zone and reducing the risk of borehole collapse. The response to borehole collapse will 
vary depending on the depth of collapse and the degree to which the integrity of the disposal 
zone is compromised. For very deep collapses, the easiest solution may be to abandon further 
drilling, case the well as-is, and begin emplacement with reduced capacity. 
5.2.2 Drill String Failure 
The drill string is a long series of pipes and collars ending with the drill bit or other tool. Drilling 
fluid is pumped down through the drill string and flows back up the well. The drill string also 
provides the torque for the drill bit. As a tool is lowered to the bottom of the well, the drill string 
is constructed with the addition of lengths of pipe. The drill string is designed to be sturdy, but it 
can fail between the bit and the surface. Broken drill pipe must be retrieved (“fished” out) or 
drilled through, and both options are costly in terms of time and materials. The drill pipe can 
become stuck on a ledge or other irregularity on the wall and become deformed or become 
trapped in place because of a borehole collapse (Bommer 2008). Drill string trouble can be 
avoided with improved management techniques, but borehole collapses and other trouble still 
happen and disrupt the drill string. As the main method for canister emplacement proposed to 
date uses a modified drill string used to emplace waste, a disrupted drill string could require a 
major retrieval operation to clear the hole of debris before removing canisters. Drill string failure 
during emplacement will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section. 
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5.3 Casing Failure 
The failure of the casing could cause major issues during the drilling or emplacement processes. 
In-situ stresses after the borehole is drilled are not static, and the effects of drilling on the host 
formation develop over the days and weeks following the removal of the rock. Some of the 
changes in forces result from chemical changes, as drilling mud moving into the formation 
during drilling can change mineralogical composition, which can weaken the rock (Moos 2001). 
Casing failure, at least in the catastrophic sense, seems unlikely to occur in the timeframes 
required to successfully emplace waste in a completed borehole, as collapse often stems from an 
earthquake (minimized by location choice) or long-term corrosion (not applicable). Minor casing 
failures or non-disjunctions (i.e. unintentional misalignment of consecutive sections of casing) 
which can serve as conduits between the well and groundwater, of major concern for wells which 
produce natural gas or oil, are not an issue for this application, as the time periods required for 
successful containment of waste are anyway likely longer than the casing will retain its integrity. 
5.4 Emplacement Failure 
Failure of the emplacement system has been identified as a potential cause of concern. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, primary options for canister emplacement are a modified drill rig, a 
drop-in method, or a cable emplacement system (as proposed in Section 3.1). The three 
identified modes of failure during emplacement are a stuck canister, a dropped canister, and a 
failure to successfully release the canister at depth. After discussing each failure mode in turn, 
the consequences of and responses to each mode of failure will be discussed. 
5.4.1 Stuck Canister 
The major mode of emplacement failure is a stuck canister. “Stuck” is defined as the inability of 
the emplacement system operator to move a canister or canisters back up the borehole after they 
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encounter an obstruction. The clearance between the canister and borehole wall under ideal 
conditions is very small (a few centimeters in the SNL reference design), so any deviation from 
ideal conditions could interrupt the descent of the canister. A borehole collapse, casing non-
disjunction (in which two sections of casing are misaligned), rockfall, or other falling object 
could cause the canisters to be stuck. 
5.4.2 Dropped Canister 
The second mode of emplacement failure is a dropped canister. Outside of a system in which a 
canister is deliberately dropped into the borehole, a dropped canister poses a potential threat to 
the health and safety of workers if the canister was damaged severely enough to release 
radionuclides into the borehole. Dropped canisters could occur if the system lowering the 
canister(s) breaks or if the canister itself separates at the point of attachment. The drill rig 
emplacement case is discussed in 5.2.2, so the cable emplacement system will be the major focus 
of this section. Again, the dropped canister terminal velocity of about 4 m/s is likely insufficient 
to damage the canister (Arnold et al. 2011, Bates 2012). If the telescoping borehole proposed in 
Chapter 3 were implemented, the terminal velocity of a BWR canister in the upper disposal 
region could be different. This possibility requires further study. 
Wire rope is created by weaving together many steel wires into a helical pattern. Damage 
to the strands of wire rope over time will eventually cause the entire cable to fail. When tension 
is applied to the rope, stress is unevenly distributed along the cylindrical profile of the rope. 
Friction between strands of the wire acts opposite to the downward force, holding wires in place. 
Individual wire rope strands, initially cylindrical, can plastically deform when subjected to stress, 
especially if this stress is perpendicular to the length of the cable. Wire rope systems change the 
direction of the cable as it travels from the spool through a system of pulleys and downward into 
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the borehole. When a long length of the wire rope has been deployed, the stress on upper regions 
of the cable increases, and this increases the forces present at contact points between the wire 
rope, the cylindrical spool, and the pulleys. At these contact points, the force pressing the cable 
against surfaces causes plastic deformation of the outer strands of the wire rope, flattening them 
(Feyrer 2007). Flattened strands, work-hardened, are more brittle and fracture more easily. 
A fractured strand does not lose usefulness under tension, as the friction from other strands 
elsewhere along the length of the cable will hold the damaged wire in place. As fracture density 
increases, the failure of the entire cable becomes more likely, as fractures increase the stress on 
nearby strands, which in turn causes more fractures. An additional cause of wire rope flattening 
(i.e. the mechanical deformation of the outside strands of a wire rope) could occur if the 
deviation of the borehole from vertical axis is large enough that the cable will make contact with 
the borehole wall (Chaplin 1995, Feyrer 2007). Swinging of the rope (i.e. horizontal motion) 
causes additional wear on the system. When carrying a load, the wire has very limited ability to 
sway back and forth as the canister descends. However, when unloaded and returning to the 
surface, the cable has considerably more room to swing. As studied in the premature failure of 
helicopter rescue line, idle swinging of a wire rope system under a preload (e.g. a hook) places 
additional bending stress on the rope and causes frictional wear between strands of the rope. It is 
hypothesized that this mode of wear would affect interior wires more than exterior ones, which is 
significant because major premature wear on interior wires would be missed during the standard 
visual inspection of the wire rope during use (Giglio and Manes 2005). For the cable 
emplacement system, fatigue from swinging would be most severe immediately after the release 
of the canister, as the weight of the cable represents the vast majority of the stress on upper 
regions. Slower upwards hoisting or guides spaced over the length of the wire could alleviate the 
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problem of swinging. The behavior of the rope upon canister release must be studied further, as 
the rope itself stretches under the load of the descending canister. Some undesirable  “snapping 
back” effect could be caused by the release of the waste canister. 
5.4.3 Release System Failure 
The release system, operated from the surface, must release the canister from the rest of the 
emplacement system once the canister has reached depth. Premature release, covered above, 
carries safety implications. Failure to release, however, is more of an economic concern. If the 
release system does not work, the canister must be hoisted back to the surface, devoting extra 
time for the return trip and repair. Ascent speed is slow, so each failed event will add additional 
cost to emplacement operations. It is difficult to predict the prevalence of this event, but it can be 
represented in the emplacement contingency time. 
5.4.4 Consequences of Emplacement Failure and Responses 
There are two major failure events that would require a response: a stuck canister and a dropped 
canister. The location of the stuck canister will likely determine the response. For canisters stuck 
within the disposal zone, a metric must be established to determine whether or not retrieval is 
more or less expensive than the ensuing recovery operations. This metric cannot be developed 
without more concrete design choices in terms of the emplacement system, and a more definite 
estimate of borehole cost. For a canister stuck above the disposal zone, retrieval operations must 
begin immediately to avoid further off-normal events that could lead to radioactive release. 
Abandonment-in-place of a canister above disposal depth is an absolute last resort, and even then 
would only be a tenable solution if the location were not too far above the disposal zone. 
Additionally, waste canisters emplaced prior to the stuck-above-disposal canister may be 
removed as well if the retrieval operations for the stuck canister compromised the geologic 
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barriers surrounding the borehole. For the case of the wire rope emplacement system, a modified 
drilling rig would probably need to be installed to recover the canister, effectively nullifying any 
advantages gained from using the wire rope system (MacGlashan 2015). Without borehole 
repository-specific guidelines from the U.S. EPA, the only guidance for determining if a single 
waste canister stuck above the disposal zone can be dealt with just by sealing the hole is to do 
detailed radionuclide release and transport analysis on whether groundwater contamination 
standards would be expected to be exceeded. 
A dropped canister is a major issue if the drop is severe enough to damage the canister 
and release radioactive material into the borehole. This could be verified by placing some sort of 
detection apparatus downhole. A damaged canister may need to be immediately sealed off from 
the rest of the borehole. Depending on the amount of damage and level of release, workers may 
need to be evacuated from areas made radioactive by the contaminated borehole fluid until 
remediation could occur. 
5.5 Engineered Barrier Failure 
Several modes have been proposed for seal failure, including over-pressurization from gases 
from corrosion reactions, chemical degradation of the seal, and microbial degradation of the seal. 
However, an analysis of seal performance is beyond the scope of this thesis. Additional sealing 
designs which eschew the more traditional clay-and-concrete barrier for solidified-in-place 
metallic seals or rock melting (Atrill and Gibb 2003a, 2003b) would have a separate set of failure 
mechanisms. The long-term performance of seals and the consequences of their premature 
failure should be considered in future work. 
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5.6 Natural Events Leading to Failure 
With a repository lifetime potentially rated to 10,000 years or longer, uncommon or long-period 
natural events must be considered in the context of repository performance. For more shallow 
repositories, glaciation has been considered as a potential issue for repository performance, since 
the weight of glaciers could force shallow water to depth. Eventually, deglaciation would reverse 
the process, potentially transporting radionuclides to the surface at faster rates. Glaciation was 
considered as a potential source of accelerated radionuclide transport by SKB in their analysis of 
the Forsmark repository (Vidstrand et al. 2010). Whether glaciation is a problem for a borehole 
repository requires further research, as the top of the disposal zone (3 km) is six times deeper 
than Forsmark’s (500 m).  
Earthquakes are another potential source of major breaches in containment. For more 
shallow repositories, site characterization would be concerned with major fracture zones and the 
seismic history of the area. Predominant fracture zones, which would increase the rate of 
groundwater transport, could potentially disqualify a repository site. For a borehole repository, 
which in the case considered here would likely sit in crystalline rock with considerable 
sedimentary overburden, major fracture zones in the overburden can be characterized with 
existing technology. Fractures at depth would be difficult to characterize, as the number of 
exploratory wells necessary to reliably “find” fractures would be large and standard fast-flow 
tests using tracers to find fractures may not be feasible at great depth. This uncertainty must be 
addressed in future work. Earthquakes during borehole construction would be uncommon, as the 
site would be specifically selected for seismic stability.  
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5.7 Intrusion Events Leading to Failure 
A primary design consideration for all nuclear waste repositories is the intrusion event, in which 
future humans deliberately or accidentally enter a repository or interfere with its containment 
barriers. Recent discussion of intrusion events in the geologic repository context can be found in 
Hansen et al. (2014) and Swift et al. (2014). Deliberate intrusion is a much larger problem for 
more shallow mined repositories, as these repositories could realistically be accessed from the 
surface and would likely contain materials of value. Such materials could be benign, like 
corrosion-resistant canister materials, or more militaristic in nature, like fissile materials 
extracted from spent fuel. For a borehole repository, a decreased reliance on expensive materials 
would likely deter attempts at mining a borehole repository; and he relative difficulty of 
extracting fissile materials from degraded canisters over many boreholes at extreme depth would 
be an additional barrier to weaponization of waste. As for accidental intrusion into a waste 
facility, it would be extraordinarily difficult for an individual to access a borehole facility in 
person, given that the great depth of disposal is rivaled only by a few of the world’s deepest gold 
mines. A more likely scenario would be accidental incursion related to petroleum exploration or 
a similar process. By choosing a location that does not possess such valuable resources at depth, 
this contingency can be avoided. In short, deep borehole repositories are unlikely to face major 
intrusion considerations. 
5.8 Summary 
Without finalizing designs for the emplacement system, it is impossible to determine an exact list 
of failure modes and responses. However, an emplacement system should be robust enough to 
deal with unforeseen issues downhole, especially in terms of retrieving fuel from troubled 
emplacement runs. A more detailed cost-benefit analysis must be performed for stuck canisters, 
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as fishing operations are expensive and time-consuming and the same could likely be said about 
retrieving stuck canisters. For a cable emplacement system, the likely retrieval method of 
installing a modified drilling rig would run counter to the whole purpose of using a cable system. 
Additionally, the method of transporting fuel from on-site transportation trucks and onto the 
emplacement system must be evaluated. The potential to drop canisters during the transfer 
process is not negligible and must be considered in greater depth. 
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6. Conclusions 
While Department of Energy-led efforts in the area of deep borehole disposal have recently 
focused on the disposition of high-level waste rather than spent nuclear fuel, this thesis provides 
some additional analysis which may prove useful if deep boreholes are eventually considered as 
a spent fuel disposal option. 
 The analytical solution to a multi-borehole heat conduction problem provided in Chapter 
2 of this thesis yields results similar to more computationally-intensive finite difference and 
finite element modeling completed at various national laboratories. The warming effect on one 
borehole from proximate boreholes was not found to be a major contributor to maximum 
disposal canister temperature in the case of older, well-aged spent fuel. This may not be the case 
for hotter wasteforms or more densely-packed borehole patterns, so this interaction should be 
considered in other work if the temperature tolerance of engineered barriers like seals and 
canister materials are narrow. 
 Chapter 3 of this thesis proposes three alternatives to choices made in the reference 
design. The wire rope emplacement system, for both economic and radiological safety reasons, 
appears to be a superior emplacement alternative to the modified drill rig system proposed in 
earlier work. The “telescoping borehole” approach also proposed in Chapter 3 could be utilized 
if deep borehole demonstration tests discover that widening a borehole at depth is more difficult 
than predicted or if maintaining borehole stability in the disposal zone is more challenging than 
previously considered. Finally, the parallel canister loading process is one of many potential 
design options which arise from differences between deep borehole disposal and more traditional 
repository scenarios. If a deep borehole repository could be deployed  at an earlier date than a 
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geologic repository, it is possible that further borehole-specific needs could change how fuel is 
processed and stored on the reactor side. 
 The logistics analysis presented in Chapter 4 considers two major questions: is a smaller-
scale regional repository cost-prohibitive, and does the method of deep borehole disposal 
dramatically change any transportation or storage logistical parameters? For the first question, 
with the exception of an unknown variation in the site characterization and licensing costs with 
scale, the difference in unit costs for spent fuel transportation, storage, and disposal do not seem 
to vary enough with the decrease in scale to prohibit a multiple-repository approach for the 
United States. The deep borehole repository’s lack of spent fuel aging facilities and build-as-
necessary borehole construction fundamentally shapes other logistical parameters at reactors and 
at the repository. The changes in “flow” of waste through the facility should absolutely be 
considered in outside work. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 of this thesis provides a simplified framework for discussing risk and 
failure within the deep borehole system. Many failure mechanisms within the deep borehole 
system are unfamiliar to other nuclear applications. Lessons learned from the petroleum and 
mining industries should be incorporated into any analysis of deep borehole disposal. This 
practice has already been adopted in the research at Sandia National Laboratories. 
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7. Future Work 
This thesis has posed a large number of questions that remain to be fully addressed. In no 
particular order, this section will summarize the areas identified for future work. 
 The logistics analysis in Chapter 4, combined with the canister loading process and 
emplacement mode discussion in Chapter 3, has clarified some of the needs of a borehole 
repository. However, it is clear that many of the unaddressed, seemingly minor details are 
extremely important to the operations of the facility as a whole. For instance, the process of 
transporting canisters from the fuel handling facility to the disposal borehole is a minor but 
integral part of the process. On paper, the act of lifting a horizontal canister on a truck bed to a 
vertical orientation from emplacement seems very simple. In reality, this process must be 
repeated thousands of times, and even a relatively low rate of failure could have serious 
consequences in the area of radiological safety. Future work should focus on surface operations 
and timing from the arrival of fuel to the facility to its emplacement down the borehole. Some of 
this work has been completed by Mui and Nutt (2014), but more work needs to be done. 
 A companion to a more detailed surface operations analysis should be a more in-depth 
economic assessment. An analysis of borehole construction costs was completed by Gibbs 
(2010), but this analysis does not include a detailed analysis of transportation costs, which cannot 
be borrowed from analyses of more traditional mined repositories. A more detailed economic 
assessment would be best performed using a specialized code, allowing for a range of cost 
estimates to be generated for the many alternatives for deployment (annual waste acceptance 
rate, waste capacity per borehole, utilization of assembly consolidation, etc.). Without a more 
thoughtful system-level economic assessment, policymakers may not be able to adequately 
compare deep borehole disposal to better-understood mined geologic repositories. 
74 
 
 Dose estimates published in Brady et al. (2009) for a standard 5 km vertical borehole are 
much lower than federal requirements. Could a shallower (and therefore less expensive) borehole 
be constructed and still successfully meet federal requirements for radionuclide containment? 
The use of a single access borehole to emplace waste in multiple disposal regions branching off 
from the central borehole, proposed by Gibbs (2010), requires consideration. Could sedimentary 
rocks (like shale) host deep borehole disposal, and could the disposal region be horizontal rather 
than vertical in order to allow for great storage capacity per vertical access borehole? 
The consideration of multilateral boreholes, shallower disposal depths, or alternative host rocks 
requires a much more expansive hydrogeological analysis beyond the scope of this thesis. It is 
possible, however, that one of these alternate designs provides the most adequate (i.e. closest to 
federal requirements) containment for the lowest cost. Multiple borehole designs should be 
considered under a framework that evaluates a “design-to-performance” approach. Instead of 
designing the safest (i.e. least contamination) nuclear waste repository for the cost of the corpus 
of the Nuclear Waste Fund, this approach would more closely compare how an incremental cost 
increase affects dose. Such an approach would require positing borehole repository 
environmental guidelines, which do not currently exist. 
 Recent work by Sandia National Laboratories (2014) has identified deep boreholes as a 
primary option for the disposal of cesium and strontium capsules stored at the Hanford Site. That 
2014 report also identified other high-level waste forms as potential candidates for borehole 
disposal. Future work on deep boreholes should evaluate a variety of waste forms for disposal, 
included DOE-managed high-level waste, non-commercial spent nuclear fuel (including spent 
naval reactor fuel), and excess plutonium from nuclear weapons decommissioning. A similar 
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logistics analysis as presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis would be a first step in evaluating these 
options. 
 In short, many of these ideas for future work could be accomplished in a systematic way 
over the course of a Ph.D. dissertation or similar comprehensive effort to frame these 
unanswered deep borehole-related questions. Work in the geoscientific areas, namely modeling 
groundwater flow in the deep subsurface for particular representative geological conditions 
require considerable computational and analyst time, and thus appear to be the most pressing 
need. Deep borehole disposal of waste forms beyond commercial spent nuclear fuel could have 
major relevance to future policy decisions in the nuclear waste sphere and should be explored 
further in the near future. 
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